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Introduction 
Technology has been one of the main economical drivers since the industrial revolution, 
easing and improving the economic progress through the introduction of new productive 
factors or innovations that has changed the way in which the economic systems is carried out. 
In last decades, the new generation born between 1980 and 2000, called “millennials”, and 
the most recent one, generation Z, composed by those born in the 21
st
 century, are 
experiencing a strict bond with technology. These people are always connected, ready to share 
or read news on social media and looking for the cheapest offer online; their new way of 
“living technology” is reshaping the economy as a whole. 
In the present research, the attention is drawn on how the technology is affecting the 
financial sector. 
When “finance” and “technology” meet, the crasis of the terms generates a new one: 
“Fintech”, which embraces a wide range of topics, from the companies developing new 
business models to the adoption of new application solutions. 
Among the relevant financial innovations introduced in recent years, I found of particular 
interest the distributed ledger technology, which is usually associated with the blockchain 
technology and is at the base of the cryptocurrencies’ development. “Bitcoin” is the 
expression of its main application since it was the first new currency that gained popularity 
some years after its release date and it is still the major cryptocurrency in the market. For this 
reason, the present analysis is focused on studying its price determination, which seems to be 
still almost unpredictable. 
An empirical analysis based on a cost of production model is carried out, trying to answer 
the following research question: “Could Bitcoin be seen as a virtual commodity?”. The aim of 
the study is to detect whether the Bitcoin price could be justified by and connected to the 
profits and costs associated with the mining effort.  
Following this purpose, a sample model is constructed, composed by the hardware devices 
employed in the mining process. After collecting all the technical information required and 
computing a cost and a profit function for each period, an implied price for the Bitcoin value 
is derived. The interconnection between this price and the historical one is thereby analyzed 
adopting a Vector Autoregression (VAR) Model. 
In the literature, researchers detect several economical determinants for Bitcoin price. It 
seems that given the new features of this cryptocurrency, price drivers will change over time. 
For this reason, several authors analyze various potential factors, which encompass technical 
aspects (such as the hashrate and output volume), user based growth, Internet components (as 
Google Trends, Wikipedia queries and Tweets), market supply and demand, financial indexes 
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(like S&P500, Dow Jones, FTSE100, Nikkei25), gold and oil prices, monetary velocity, 
exchange rate of Bitcoin express in US dollar, euro and yen. 
It is not yet clear which are the definitive drivers for Bitcoin price, probably the intuition of 
their variability over time is credible and many factors should be expressed and studied at the 
same time to avoid misleading results. 
Although this uncertainty, Bitcoin has undoubtedly introduced on the market a new way to 
think about money transfers and exchanges. The distributed ledger technology could be a 
disruptive innovation for the financial sector, since it can ease communication without the 
need of a central authority. Moreover, the spread of private cryptocurrencies, which enter into 
competition with the public forms of money, could affect the monetary policy and the 
financial stability pursued by official institutions. For this reasons, central banks all over the 
word are seeking to understand if it is possible to adopt this technology in their daily 
operations, with the aim to include it in the financial system and control its implementations, 
enhancing its benefits and reducing its risks. 
In this regard, authorities are investigating the introduction of Central Bank Digital 
Currency (CBDC) or Cryptocurrencies (CBCC), with the latter being a subcategory of the 
former. Few possible scenarios seem to be feasible with the future, depending on the results of 
further studies on this topic, additional developments, social behavior and preferences. 
The present work is divided into three sections. In the first one I give a definition of 
Fintech and list its main innovations by economic functions, highlighting the potential 
benefits and risks of this new development field. After providing a broad regulatory 
framework, I focus the attention on cryptocurrency, and in particular on Bitcoin, explaining 
how the blockchain works. 
I develop the research question in the second section, describing the methodology behind 
the implemented cost of production model, the sources consulted to collect data, the hardware 
sample composition and the formulas derivations. I present the econometric approach 
adopted, and discuss the main findings. Then, I expose a literature overview, presenting those 
papers that investigate other drivers for Bitcoin price formation, developing an alternative 
approach. 
In the third and last part, I consider the framework under which the idea of public digital 
currency has been developed and give a definition of Central Bank Digital Currency (CBDC) 
and of Cryptocurrency (CBCC). Four possible scenarios concerning their future applications 
are introduced, and I finally conclude by providing some examples of countries that want to 
implement the distributed ledger technology in the future or have already attempted to apply it 
in their daily operations. 
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Section 1 
In this section I introduce the topic of FinTech, defining which economic functions are 
affected by these new technological innovations and identifying the main drivers. I proceed in 
my analysis specifying their potential benefits and risks and giving a broad view of the 
regulatory frameworks. In the last part I present a cryptocurrency overview and focus the 
attention on Bitcoin. 
1.1 What is FinTech? 
A strict definition of FinTech seems to be missing since it embraces different companies 
and technologies, but a wider one could assert that FinTech includes those companies that are 
developing new business models, applications, products or process based on new digital 
technologies applied in finance. 
FSB (2017) defines FinTech as “technology-enabled innovation in financial services that 
could result in new business models, applications, processes or products with an associated 
material effect on the provision of financial services”. 
OECD (2018) analyses instead various definitions from different sources
1
, concluding that 
none of them is complete since “FinTech involves not only the application of new digital 
technologies to financial services but also the development of business models and products 
which rely on these technologies and more generally on digital platform and processes”. 
The services offered by these companies are indeed various: some are providing financial 
intermediation services (FinTech companies), while others offer ancillary services relating to 
the financial intermediation activity (TechFin companies). Technology is for FinTech firms 
an instrument, a productive factor, an input, while for TechFin firms it is the final product, the 
output. The latter are already familiar with different technologies and innovation; hence they 
could easily diversify their production by adding some digital and financial services to the 
products they already offer. They enjoy a situation of privileged competition because they are 
already known in the market due to their previous non-financial services and thus could take 
advantage of their customers’ information to enlarge their supply of financial services. 
TechFin firms are the main competitors for FinTech companies
2
. 
The sure thing is that FinTech, or financial technology, is changing the way in which 
financial operations are carried out by introducing new ways to save, borrow and invest, 
without dealing with traditional banks. 
                                                          
1
 OECD, (2018). Financial Markets, Insurance and Pensions pp. 10. 
2
 Schena, C., Tanda, A., Arlotta, C., Potenza G., (2018). CONSOB. Lo sviluppo del FinTech pp 10-11. 
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FinTech platforms, firms and startups rose after the global financial crisis in 2008 as a 
consequence of the loss of trust in the traditional financial sector. In addition, digital natives 
(or millennials, born between 1980 and 2000) seemed interested in this new approach 
proposed by FinTech entrepreneurs. Millennials were old enough to be potential customers, 
who feel much more related to these new, fresh mobile services offered through mobile 
platforms and apps, rather than bankers. The strength of these new technologies lies in their 
transparent and easy-to-use interfaces that was seen as an answer to the trust crisis towards 
banks
3
. 
We expect the main driving forces behind innovation will come from less developed 
countries because their lack of infrastructures provides room for new technologies 
implementation that could not be adopted in the over-banked economies of the West. Whereas 
FinTech innovations in developed countries involve primarily the online customer experience 
by trying to simplify all the procedure, startups in developing countries are focused on cell 
phone users. This because in these geographical areas is easy to possess a smartphone rather 
than have access to a bank account. Therefore, FinTech in developing countries has the aim to 
create new infrastructures and improve people inclusion in the real economy, rather to 
enhance existing services. 
1.2 Categories, Innovations and Drivers 
The Financial Stability Board published a report in 2017 describing in depth the FinTech 
sector and carrying particular attention to the financial stability implication deriving from the 
adoption of these new technologies. 
The authors classify FinTech innovations in five categories, organized by the provided 
services, which are seen as efforts to reduce some financial frictions such as the information 
asymmetries, negative externalities, incomplete markets, behavioral distortions, misaligned 
incentives, and network effects. 
Figure 1 shows these five categories: (i) payments, clearing and settlement; (ii) deposits, 
lending and capital raising; (iii) insurance; (iv) investment management; and (v) market 
support. 
  
                                                          
3
 Chishti, S., Barberis, J., (2016). The FinTech Book. Menat, R., Why they are so Excited About FinTech pp 10. 
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Figure 1: Stylized classification of selected FinTech innovations by economic function 
 
Source: Financial Stability Board (2017) 
The graph defines the economic functions and connects each of them to some specific 
technology innovations. For example, the “payments, clearing and settlements” function is 
linked to DLT applications on which digital currencies are based and that required digital ID 
verification and an adequate regulatory framework. 
I want to provide now a brief overview on the main innovations that are being applied in 
finance by focusing on distributed ledger technologies (DLT) and blockchain, crowdfunding, 
robo advice, big data applications, internet of things (IoT), cloud computing applications, 
artificial intelligence and machine learning, digital ID verification and finally RegTech. They 
are highly interconnected, and, in some cases, their borders tend to blur over time. 
 Distributed Ledger Technologies (DLT) and blockchain 
Distributed Ledger Technologies (DLT), commonly associated to the blockchain (its 
popular form), is a decentralized and transparent database technology, distributed across many 
computers, whose record is available to everyone at any time. It allows to create, transfer and 
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store information. Since it is a peer-to-peer network, DLT incorporates two important 
features. Firstly, by construction, it does not require the need for intermediaries, such as 
banks, to keep records for all transactions that took place. Secondly, it is a technical solution 
to the double-spending problem. The system is trustless, meaning that it does not required 
verification by third parties, but it is based on consensus among network users and every 
participant should authenticate and verify each information to avoid that the same transaction 
happens multiple times. New blocks are added to the chain, or ledger, often through a proof-
of-work (PoW)
4
 or proof-of-stake (PoS)
5
 consensus mechanism. 
Each transaction needs to be recorded twice: on the virtual ledger of both the buyer and the 
seller. The link between them is recorded perpetually on the central blockchain node. Here 
lies the strength of this new technology: it allows updating the database simultaneously. 
Participants provide their identity by using cryptography and digital signature, rather than 
ID. In this respect, there are two types of blockchains: public chains and permissioned chains 
based on whether or not they demand some sort of accreditation. The latter does not require 
mining effort and network participants are entitled only to check the validity of the 
transactions. This structure is more secure as the risk of cyberattack is reduced. Moreover, 
since this kind of ledger is available only to community members, it is more appropriate to 
contain confidential information. This new technology has been applied in many fields, such 
as: banking sector, payments and money transfer, insurance, cybersecurity and 
cryptocurrencies. 
 Crowdfunding 
Platforms that fall into this section help individuals to raise some money from large 
number of people and are divided into two different categories based on whether they provide 
a financial return or not: donation-based or reward-based models and equity-based or lending-
based platforms. 
 Robo advice 
The noun “robo advisor” does not always indicate something robotic, nor something that 
always gives advice. It is more than a journalistic term. Robo advisors are, indeed, automated 
investment solutions that can automatically rebalance a portfolio using complicated 
algorithms built on passive investments, investor’s risk preference and diversification 
strategies. They provide investors with digital tools that allow them to self-asses and shape 
                                                          
4
 PoW protocols are based on two possible algorithms: SHA-256 hash functions (as the case of Bitcoin) and 
scrypt (as Littlecoin). 
5
 PoS protocol differs from the PoW by the method adopted to ensure the safety of a system. PoS is indeed based 
on the concept of “coin age” while PoW protocol requires users to do some “work”. Tasca, P., (2015). Digital 
Currencies: Principles, Trends, Opportunities, and Risks pp 11. 
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their investment behavior. Robo advisors, in order to be considered as such, must exhibit at 
least some of these elements: provide full digital access; perform automated portfolio 
rebalancing; adopt indexation or passive management; personalize to customers’ goals and 
behavior
6
. 
 Big Data applications 
Big Data derived from the digitalization of daily activities and are composed by data 
gathered in various forms: texts, numbers, images, video and audio clips generated by 
communications between devices (e.g. smartphones, PCs). Such data could be used for many 
scopes, as improve market research or target advertising based on individual’s interests and 
Internet use. This technology is closely related to those of Internet of Things (IoT), cloud 
computing and artificial intelligence. 
 Internet of Things (IoT) 
It includes all devices able to capture information regarding physical movements of the 
customers and, as source of big data, can be used to tailor products, individual willingness to 
pay and assess risk profiles. Smartwatches are examples of wearable IoT. 
 Cloud computing applications 
These applications increase the ability of financial institutions to collect and analyze data 
since they provide a cheap and easy way to process and store them. 
 Artificial intelligence and machine learning 
Artificial intelligence is commonly used as another world for machine learning and 
indicates machines programmed to elaborate historical inputs, identify patterns and classify 
new data. It is important to point out that these machines, despite the name, need a constant 
human supervision in order to ensure the correct interpretation of data. They are applied in a 
wide range of scope as recognition, understanding, learning, problem solving, reasoning and 
decision making
7
. 
 Digital ID verification 
New digital ID verifications rely on biometric technologies able to recognize individuals’ 
physiological or behavioral characteristics useful to verify users’ identity. The aim is to 
increase the security of data transaction involving, in addition to common passwords, other 
verifications like fingerprint or iris scanning, voice authentication and face recognition. 
  
                                                          
6
 Chishti, S., Barberis, J., (2016). The FinTech Book. Sironi, P. My Robo Advisor was an iPod – Applying the 
Lessons from Other Sectors to FinTech Disruption pp 152. 
7
 OECD. (2018). Financial Markets, Insurance and Pensions pp 13. 
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 RegTech 
RegTech is the latest development of FinTech and is designed to efficiently solve 
regulatory and compliance requirement by using technologies like machine learning, 
biometric and application programming interfaces (APIs)
8
. 
Talking about financial innovations is useful to highlight which are their traditional drivers 
that affect the demand side or the supply side (Figure 2). The first side entails the shifting in 
consumer preferences, driven by a higher consumer expectation for more convenient, fast, 
“user-friendly” and cheaper services. The second side implies expectations on both the 
evolutions of the provided technologies, such as those related to internet, big data, mobile 
phone and computer power, and regulatory requirements, which are expected to change with 
the technological progress. 
Figure 2: Drivers of financial innovation 
 
Source: Financial Stability Board (2017) 
New services providers could either grow independently as competitors for the traditional 
ones or could be purchased by banks. By doing so the market could reach different levels of 
concentration. At this point three aspects of the market structure must be considered: the 
concentration, the contestability and the composition. 
Concentration refers to “the distribution of market share among competitors offering 
similar services”9. It could diminish if the competition raises, lowering the market power of 
intermediaries and hence driving prices down. Technology increases competition in the 
market by lowering the barriers and the costs to entry for new players. This idea is connected 
                                                          
8
 APIs are particular applications that allow users to have access to data or features of an open system or service 
and to embed them into new applications. An example is Google Maps that, with its API, gives third party 
developers the chance to add maps to their own application, such as Uber. 
9
 Financial Stability Board. (2017). Financial Stability Implications from FinTech. Supervisory and Regulatory 
Issues that Merit Authorities’ Attention pp 11 
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with the contestability of the market with oligopolistic structure
10
, where new entrants could 
be either innovations technology leaders or firms that obtain access to new technologies. The 
threat of a higher competition curtails the pricing power of the incumbents. Due to all these 
aspects, the composition of the service providers in the financial sector could be modified 
with the consequent result that some new activities fall outside the current regulation, leading 
to financial stability concerns for the policymakers. 
1.3 Benefits and Risks 
Besides these new concerns and their related risks, new technology innovations could also 
enhance the provision of financial services, reducing the existing frictions for the benefit of 
the entire system. Table 1 presents the main benefits and risks that financial technologies can 
produce in a system. Risks are divided into subcategories: microfinancial and macrofinancial. 
Table 1: FinTech benefits and risks 
BENEFITS 
RISKS 
MICROFINANCIAL MACROFINANCIAL 
Decentralization and 
diversification 
Efficiency 
Transparency 
Access to, and convenience 
of, financial services 
financial sources 
Contagion 
Procyclicality 
Excess volatility 
Systemic importance 
Maturity mismatch 
Liquidity mismatch 
Leverage 
operational sources 
Governance/process control 
Cyber risk 
Third-party reliance 
Legal/regulatory risk 
Business risk critical FMIs 
Source: Author’s elaboration 
  
                                                          
10
 The lack of barriers represents a threat of potential entry in a market and increases the competition among 
firms operating in the sector. 
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1.3.1 Potential Benefits 
The main advantages driven by new financial technologies to financial stability are 
identified by the FSB as: decentralization and diversification, efficiency, transparency and 
accesso to, or convenience of, financial services. 
 Decentralization and diversification in the markets can significantly reduce the effects 
of financial shocks that occur in the system. If a market is sufficiently decentralized and 
diversified, a distress situation of an institution can unlikely spread its risk into the market, 
avoiding affecting similar service providers or the related intermediaries. An example of 
technology in this respect could be robo-advice that, due to its reasonable fixed costs and 
characteristics, reduces the barriers to entry allowing smaller firms to operate in the same 
framework as the biggest one. 
 Efficiency, enforced also by the incentives created from contestability, encourages and 
enhances the development of stable business models, leading benefits to the overall financial 
system. This could be done for examples with machine learning and AI process that facilitate 
improvements in decision-making processes in favor of both financial institutions and 
investors. Robo-advisors could again use algorithms to assess costumers’ creditworthiness in 
a faster and secure way, reducing operational costs for those platforms implementing the 
technology. Greater efficiency and higher speed while executing transactions could be 
ensured by distributed ledgers, which contributes to reduce both risks and settlement time 
required. This has the important effect to curtail the time during which one counterparty is 
exposed to another. A higher settlement speed leads also to the advantage to unlock collateral 
and capital for other productive uses. 
 Transparency reduces information asymmetries, allowing risks to be properly priced 
and assessed. It improves the creation of financial instruments with specific features linked to 
determined financial risks. By doing so, transparency enables market participants to manage 
risk in a more efficient way. Smart contract has, in this regard, the goal to properly specify 
those particular risks that users wish to manage
11
. 
 Access to, or convenience of, financial services foster the financial inclusion of 
different households and businesses, leading to a diversified exposure to investment risk and 
supporting a sustainable economic growth. We would expect that the larger is the unbanked 
population in a region, the greatest is the success of technologies providing access to financial 
services. The reason is that often in rural regions, where the financial system is 
                                                          
11
 Smart contracts, also called cryptocontracts, are based on blockchain technology. Buyers and sellers write the 
terms of the agreement in lines of code, planning the self-execution of the contracts if the specified conditions 
occur. Their subscriptions is transparent, irreversible and traceable. 
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underdeveloped, the share of cell phone owners is higher than the share of people with access 
to a bank account. This encourages the diffusion of technologies available from mobile 
phones, such as digital identity and DLT-based applications, to improve the quality of 
financial services. 
1.3.2 Potential Risks 
FinTech innovations, although there are no evidences nowadays, can potentially mine the 
financial stability through their intrinsic features and characteristics. FSB analyzed these 
critical aspects by considering microfinancial risks, linked to both financial and operational 
sources, and macrofinancial risks. 
1.3.2.1 Microfinancial Risks 
Microfinancial risks gather together two broad categories: financial and operational/non-
financial sources, which arise from human errors, management failures or external influences. 
Financial sources 
 Maturity mismatch arises when the loan period is larger than the related financing 
period. This entails the necessity to contract new debt, creating rollover risk
12
, which if not 
controlled could result into systemic risk. 
 Liquidity mismatch occurs when assets and liabilities are characterized by different 
liquidity features and the consequent “run risk” forces to promptly liquidate relatively illiquid 
assets. This procedure causes instability and disrupts markets. 
 Leverage, if too high, implies less equity available to cover potential unexpected 
losses, deriving from different critical sources. This potentially increases the exposure of 
systemically counterparties to the risk of sudden losses. 
Operational or non-financial sources 
 Governance/process control, if not adequate, raises the risk of direct disruption while 
providing financial services. New providers can, indeed, fall outside the regulatory perimeter 
and be subject to less restrictive regulatory measures. The growth of these entities can 
endanger the financial system. 
 Cyber risks are likely to happen the more different institutions are connected together 
as a broader use of digital services and technology enlarge the number of entry points cyber 
hackers might target. Besides that, there is still a chance that financial services evolve in a 
                                                          
12
 Rollover risk is connected to the refinancing of debt and is faced when a debt obligation is going to mature but 
a country or company needs additional capital. The debt is hence rolled over, or converted, into new debt. 
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way that, by diversifying the offered services and increasing competition, makes any cyber-
attack less systemically significant. 
 Third-party reliance is a critical factor since if this third-party, on which different 
institutions or markets rely, is facing a distress, the counterparties could be likely affected. 
The more central this third-party is in linking together essential institutions or market, the 
higher is the chance that a disruption can create systemic risk. 
 Legal/regulatory risk is greater when new activities are developing and where 
regulation does not update or is inadequate and insufficient. 
 Business risk of critical financial market infrastructures (FMIs) points at those entities 
vulnerable to external factors that could affect the balance sheet and, as a consequence, lead to 
a withdrawal of financial services. 
1.3.2.2 Macrofinancial Risks 
 Contagion is a common risk in presence of highly interconnected services. A distress 
in a single financial institution or sector can be transferred to others, leading to a loss of 
confidence in the overall system. Moreover, a greater automation in trading strategies may 
cause an unforeseeable form of contagion in the financial market
13
. 
 Procyclicality risk may be aggravated by market participants’ behavior, which steers 
to larger fluctuations in the system over the short and the long term as well. Examples are the 
low prices for risk demanded in the financial markets during good times, and the high-risk 
premia required by investors during bad times. 
 Excess volatility could be a characteristic of the financial market when it overreacts to 
news. The adverse outcomes may create a spiral through the system that leads to solvency or 
liquidity problems and this effect has a higher chance to occur if business models are 
homogeneous or exposed to common risks. FinTech innovations can exacerbate the volatility 
in the system and make it more sensitive to news, by entailing faster operations and 
transactions and allowing easily changing decision. 
 Systemic importance may be another critical factor. If institutions are perceived as 
being systemically important or too highly interconnected to fail, the risk of moral hazard 
increases since they can feel confident to be rescued by the public authorities and therefore 
decide to take excessive risks. 
  
                                                          
13
 An example is the Flash Crash on May 2010, which involves high frequency traders. 
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1.4 Regulatory Frameworks 
Regulatory frameworks for FinTech innovations are updating frequently due to the features 
of these new technologies and differ widely between jurisdictions. Discrepancies in 
regulations depend, firstly, on the size and the structure of the domestic FinTech sector but 
also on the flexibility and scope of existing frameworks. 
Many FinTech activities and business models may be not properly regulated. This could 
depend on the existing regulatory frameworks, too rigid compared to the flexibility required 
to go hand in hand with  these new services, but could also depend on the fact that even if 
some entities fall under the regulatory perimeter, they are required to provide only few reports 
on their activities. 
Regulation efforts focus primarily on the areas of payments and capital rising. Many 
jurisdictions have issued new rules in the fields of mobile payments, non-bank payments and 
digital currencies in order to ease financial inclusion and guarantee safe new payment 
services. In 2007 EU has introduced a tailored regulatory framework to rule the market of 
payment services provided by non-bank entities. The aim was to clarify the legal terms of 
these services, addressing the related risks of fraud, money laundering and terrorism 
financing. In 2015 EU has revised its directive on this subject. 
Most jurisdictions, with the aim to prevent money laundering and terrorism financing, has 
imposed further methods for verified clients’ identities with know your customer (KYC) 
identification rules, use of electronic signatures and biometric information. Furthermore, to 
foster innovation and enhance interactions between FinTech entities, many instruments like 
sandboxes, accelerators and innovation hubs were developed
14
. These tools are viewed as 
important sources of information to access risks and incentives of these developing FinTech 
activities. 
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 See Financial Stability Board. (2017). Financial Stability Implications from FinTech. Supervisory and 
Regulatory Issues that Merit Authorities’ Attention pp 28. 
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1.5 Cryptocurrencies Overview 
After the first Bitcoin has been sent in January 2009, a hundred of new cryptocurrencies 
started being traded in the market, whose common element is to rely on a public ledger (or 
blockchain technology).  
In addition to Bitcoin, in fact, other cryptocurrencies gained popularity, such as: Ethereum 
(ETH), Dash, Monero (XMR), Ripple (XRP) and Litecoin (LTC)
15
. 
Ethereum (ETH) was officially launched in 2015 and is a decentralized computing 
platform characterized by its own programming language. 
Dash was introduced in 2014 but significantly increased its market value only in 2017. The 
peculiarity of this digital coin is that, in contrast with other cryptocurrencies, block rewards 
are equally shared among community participants and a revenue percentage (equal to 10%) is 
stored in the “treasury” to fund further improvements, marketing and network operations. 
Monero (XMR), launched in 2014, is a system that guarantees anonymous digital cash by 
hiding the features of the transacted coins. Its market value raised in 2016. 
Ripple (XRP) has the unique feature to be based on a “global consensus ledger” rather than 
on blockchain technology. Its protocol is adopted by large institutions like banks and money 
service businesses. 
Litecoin (LTC) appeared for the first time in 2011 and is characterized by a large supply of 
84 million LTC. Its functioning is based on the same of Bitcoin, but some parameters were 
altered (the mining algorithm is based on Scrypt rather than Bitcoin’s SHA-265). 
Despite the creation of these new cryptocurrencies, Bitcoin remains the first in terms of 
usage and for this reason my analysis is focused on it. 
1.5.1 Bitcoin 
Bitcoin was conceived by a person or a group of people under the pseudonym Satoshi 
Nakamoto, who in a paper probably released in 2008, presented the main features of this 
popular currency. It relies on open source software and an open protocol, and thus everyone 
with some basic computer skills has access to its source code and could start the creation of 
new digital currencies.  
Nakamoto in his paper describes how transactions work giving firstly a definition of 
electronic coin as a chain of digital signatures. To transfer a coin the owner must digitally sign 
two elements:  a hash from the previous transaction, which is an algorithm that translates and 
reduces large data into others with a fixed length, and the payee’s public key. Both elements 
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are added in this way to the ending part of the coin. The new owner can verify the ownership 
by checking his new signature (Figure 3). 
Figure 3: Transaction Framework 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
Source: Nakamoto (ndr.) 
Bitcoin, as already seen, relies on the blockchain technologies, a peer-to-peer network that 
avoids banks intermediation and allows solving the double-spending problem. Transactions 
are publicly announced enabling participants to gain knowledge on them and accept their 
sequence. 
Despite simultaneously updating multiple website containing copies of the blockchain 
reduces the risk that the same amount would be spent twice, this risk is not completely 
eliminated in fast transactions, since they are a matter of seconds, but usually required ten or 
more minutes to be effectively recorded
16
. 
Nakamoto proposes a system based on a timestamp server (Figure 4), which consists in 
publishing a hash of a block of items. Each timestamp includes in its hash the previous 
timestamp and forms a chain. Additional timestamps consolidate the previous ones. 
Figure 4: Timestamp Server 
 
 
 
 Source: Nakamoto (ndr.) 
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In order to carry out the timestamp server, a proof-of-work system (PoW) is required and 
implemented by adding a nonce, an arbitrary number, to the block (Figure 5). When the 
required value to decode this block is found, the hardware effort satisfies this proof and the 
new block is created and attached to the chain. At this point the block cannot be modified 
without repeating all the procedure again. Through this process called “mining”, which 
consists basically in finding the solution of a computational problem, new Bitcoins are 
created. 
Figure 5: Proof-of-Work 
 
Source: Nakamoto (ndr.) 
If a major of honest participants is exploiting its hardware’s computational power to solve 
these blocks, an honest chain will grow faster. An hacker attack would be possible only if a 
group of malicious users takes control of the major computational power but in order to 
achieve this aim they should redo the proof-of-work of a selected block and its subsequent 
blocks, which requires an incredibly amount of effort since the success possibility decreases 
as new blocks are added to the chain. 
As new hardware are developed and launched on the market, the proof-of-work difficulty, 
on which the computational problem that miners have to solve is based, increases over time in 
order to maintain constant the average number of blocks founded within an hour. Moreover, 
Bitcoin supply is a limit number of 21 million, which is expected to be reached around 2140. 
Nakamoto defines in his work the fundamental steps of the network: 
1) “New transactions are broadcast to all nodes. 
2) Each node collects new transactions into a block. 
3) Each node works on finding a difficult proof-of-work for its block. 
4) When a node finds a proof-of-work, it broadcasts the block to all nodes. 
5) Nodes accept the block only if all transactions in it are valid and not already spent. 
6) Nodes express their acceptance of the block by working on creating the next block in 
the chain, using the hash of the accepted block as the previous hash”17. 
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The longest chain is considered the correct one by nodes but if a couple of them broadcast 
two different versions of the next block at the same time, these are accepted by different 
nodes simultaneously. To solve this information conflict, nodes work on the first version 
received but contemporaneously save the other in order to see how it develops. The next-
proof-of-work determines the valid branch, which becomes the extended one. Done that, the 
other is disregard. 
Miners add records to the chain of both the new blocks mined and the recent transactions. 
To give network users an incentive to register deals, fees are provided but the major payoff is 
given by Bitcoin mining. In order to increase the probability of success in mining process, 
specialized hardware are sold and miners can pool together their computers. Incentives are 
aimed to stimulate nodes to stay honest. In fact, a malicious hacker should find more 
profitable to act by rules than compromise the validity of the system, even if he gained the 
major computational power and could act following his own interest. 
Transactions are composed by different inputs and outputs in order to be combined and 
separated if it is required. But since there could be multiple inputs, composed by small 
amounts of previous submitted transactions, outputs could be at most two: the payment and 
the change, if any (Figure 6). 
Figure 6: Transaction input and output 
 
 
 
Source: Nakamoto (ndr.) 
Bitcoin holders keep track of their balances by using “wallets”, which do not contain 
Bitcoins since they are a sort of spreadsheet programs where personal balances are recorded. 
Since this cryptocurrency relies on blockchain technology, each user has a personal “address” 
which is a public key used to record personal transactions and track individual balances. As 
already mentioned, public-key cryptography is connected to both private and public keys that 
allow encrypting and decrypting massages and checking whether a transaction is valid.  
Wallets record the public key (the address) and the private key. If somebody forgets his 
private key, it cannot be recovered, and Bitcoins are lost since there is no way to transfer the 
amount owned to anyone else. On the other hand, if a computer hacker obtains a user’s 
private key, he could send Bitcoins to another address, successfully stealing them. For the 
victim it would be impossible to recover his losses, even though he knows the thief’s address 
18 
 
(the public key). In order to reverse the transaction, the victim must know the thief’s private 
key. 
The main advantage of this new digital currency is its low cost of transaction and, contrary 
on what many people think, anonymity was not one of its main features when this network 
was designed. An individual could attempt to make his identity less obvious but the evidences 
available by now do not support the claim that it could be hidden easily, probably it may be 
impossible. To this purpose fiat physical currencies remain the best option.  
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Section 2 
Starting from my research question “Could Bitcoin be seen as a virtual commodity?”, I 
tried to study the evolution of Bitcoin price by considering a cost of production model 
introduced by Hayes in his research papers. Adding to his analysis some adjustment proposed 
by Abbatemarco et al. (2018), I recover a series for the hypothetical underling price and study 
the relationship between this price and the historical one using a Vector Autoregression 
model. I conclude by presenting the literature on the relevant drivers of Bitcoin price 
determination. 
2.1 Estimation of Bitcoin Price 
Adam S. Hayes in this paper “A Cost of Production Model for Bitcoin” (2015) analyses the 
Bitcoin price formation from a different point of view. As the title of the paper suggests he 
considers the cryptocurrency as a virtual commodity, starting from the three ways by which 
an individual could obtain it. Firstly, a person could buy Bitcoins directly in an online 
marketplace by giving in exchange fiat currencies or other types of cryptocurrencies. 
Secondly, he can accept them as payment and finally an individual can decide to “mine” 
Bitcoins, which consists in producing new units, by using computer hardware designed for 
this purpose. This latter case involves an electrical consumption and a rational agent would 
not be involved in the mining process if the marginal costs of this operation exceeds its 
marginal profits. The ratio between these values determines the cost of production price that is 
the theoretical value underlying the market price, around which it is supposed to gravitate. 
The author wrote other two papers based on his intuition, which are “Cryptocurrency 
Value Formation: An empirical analysis leading to a cost of production model for valuing 
Bitcoin” (2016) and “Bitcoin price and its marginal cost of production: support for a 
fundamental value” (2018).  
The first one is a cross-sectional empirical analysis that examines 66 different 
cryptocurrencies in order to identify the main determinants for any cryptocurrency value 
formation. The results suggest that it is determined by the differences in the relative cost of 
production on the margin. More precisely, the fundamental drivers according to his view are: 
the competition level among miners (measured by the computational power); the coin’s 
production rate and the hardness implied in the mining algorithm.  The number of units that 
have been already created (the total money supply) seem not to be a driving factor. 
In his last work (2018), Hayes back-tests the pricing model against the historical market 
price to consolidate the validity of his theory. The findings show how Bitcoin price is 
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significantly described by the cryptocurrency’s marginal cost of production and suggest that it 
does not depends on other exogenous factors. The conclusion is that during period in which 
price bubbles happen, there will be a convergence between the market price and the model 
price to solve the discrepancy. 
Abbatemarco et al. (2018)
18
 resume Hayes’ studies introducing further elements missed in 
the previous formulation. The final result confirms Hayes’ findings: the marginal cost model 
provides a good proxy for Bitcoin market price, but the development of a speculative bubble 
is not ruled out. 
Since these studies were published before Bitcoin price raise reached its peak on the 19
th
 
December 2017
19
, the aim of my thesis is to replicate the analysis considering a larger time 
frame and verify if, even in this case, the results are unchanged. For this purpose, I replicate 
the cost of production model to value the Bitcoin price proposed by Hayes
20
. 
2.1.1 Formulas 
The marginal cost function, which estimates the electrical costs of the devices used in the 
mining process, is presented as (1): 
𝐶𝑂𝑆𝑇 $
𝑑𝑎𝑦
= 𝐻ℎ𝑎𝑠ℎ
𝑠
∗ 𝐸𝑓𝑓 𝐽
ℎ𝑎𝑠ℎ
∗ 𝐶𝐸 $
𝑘𝑊ℎ
∗ 24 ℎ
𝑑𝑎𝑦
                                                                  (1)  
Where: 
𝐻ℎ𝑎𝑠ℎ/𝑠 is the hashrate (measured by hash/second); 
𝐸𝐹𝐹𝐽/ℎ𝑎𝑠ℎ is the energy efficiency of the devices involved in the process and it is measured by 
Joule/hash; 
𝐶𝐸$/𝑘𝑊ℎ is the electricity cost computed by US dollar per Kilowatt/hour; 
24 is the number of hours in a day; 
A marginal profit function, which estimates the reward of the mining activity, is instead 
depicted as (2): 
𝑃𝑅𝑂𝐹𝐼𝑇𝐵𝑇𝐶
𝑑𝑎𝑦
= 𝐵𝑅𝐵𝑇𝐶 ∗ [
3600𝑠
ℎ
∗24 ℎ
𝑑𝑎𝑦
𝐵𝑇𝑠
]                          (2) 
Where: 
𝐵𝑅𝐵𝑇𝐶 is the block reward that refers to new Bitcoins distributed to miners who successfully 
solved a block (hence it is measured by BTC) and it is given by a geometric progression (3): 
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𝐵𝑅𝐵𝑇𝐶 = 𝐵𝑅1 ∗
1
2
𝑛−1
                                                               (3) 
n increases by 1 every 210.000 blocks. At the beginning it was 𝐵𝑅1 = 50 but during time it 
halved twice: on the 29
th
 November 2012 and on the 10
th
 July 2016. 
3600 is the number of seconds in an hour; 
24 is again the number of hours in a day; 
𝐵𝑇𝑠 is the block time, which is expressed as the seconds needed to generate a block (around 
600 seconds = 10 minutes), and it is computed as (4): 
𝐵𝑇𝑠 = 
𝐷∗232
𝐻
                                                                                                                      (4) 
Where H = hashrate and D = difficulty. The latter variable specifies how hard is to generate a 
new block in terms of computational power given a specific hashrate. This is the value that 
changes frequently to ensure a 𝐵𝑇𝑠 close to 10 minutes
21
. 
In addition to the variables already considered I want to introduce some adjustments 
proposed by Abbatemarco et al. (2018), who thought there were two elements missing in 
Hayes’ formulations. 
They add, on the cost side, the one required to maintain and update miners’ hardware 
(MAN, expressed in US dollar) and on the profit side, the fees (FEES) received by miners 
who place transactions in a block
22
. 
Maintenance costs are computed as a ratio between the weighted devices price and their 
weighted lifespan (5), while fees, computed by BTC, are measured as a ratio between the 
daily total transaction fees and the number of daily transactions
23
 (6). 
𝑀𝐴𝑁$  =
𝑊𝑒𝑖𝑔ℎ𝑡𝑒𝑑 𝐷𝑒𝑣𝑖𝑐𝑒𝑠 𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒$
𝑊𝑒𝑖𝑔ℎ𝑡𝑒𝑑 𝐿𝑖𝑓𝑒𝑠𝑝𝑎𝑛
                                                                                         (5) 
𝐹𝐸𝐸𝑆𝐵𝑇𝐶  =  
𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑇𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑠𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝐹𝑒𝑒𝑠 (𝐵𝑇𝐶)
𝐷𝑎𝑖𝑙𝑦 𝑇𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑠𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝐹𝑒𝑒𝑠
                                                                            (6) 
The new equations become: 
𝐶𝑂𝑆𝑇 $
𝑑𝑎𝑦
= 𝐻ℎ𝑎𝑠ℎ
𝑠
 ∗ 𝐸𝑓𝑓 𝐽
ℎ𝑎𝑠ℎ
∗ 𝐶𝐸 $
𝑘𝑊ℎ
∗ 24 ℎ
𝑑𝑎𝑦
+ 𝑀𝐴𝑁$                                                 (7) 
𝑃𝑅𝑂𝐹𝐼𝑇𝐵𝑇𝐶
𝑑𝑎𝑦
= 𝐵𝑅𝐵𝑇𝐶 ∗ [
3600𝑠
ℎ
∗24 ℎ
𝑑𝑎𝑦
𝐵𝑇𝑠
] + 𝐹𝐸𝐸𝑆𝐵𝑇𝐶                                                           (8) 
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Moreover, due to the equality 1 Joule = 1 Watt*second, the equation (7) could be 
expressed as follows: 
𝐶𝑂𝑆𝑇$/𝑑𝑎𝑦 =  𝐻ℎ𝑎𝑠ℎ/𝑠  ∗ 𝐸𝑓𝑓𝑊∗𝑠
ℎ𝑎𝑠ℎ
∗ 𝐶𝐸 $
𝑘𝑊ℎ
∗ 24ℎ/𝑑𝑎𝑦 + 𝑀𝐴𝑁$                                      (9) 
And by converting Watt in Kilowatt/hour, it can be written as: 
𝐶𝑂𝑆𝑇$/𝑑𝑎𝑦 =  𝐻ℎ𝑎𝑠ℎ/𝑠  ∗  
𝐸𝑓𝑓 𝑊∗𝑠
ℎ𝑎𝑠ℎ
1000
 ∗ 𝐶𝐸 $
𝑘𝑊ℎ
∗ 24ℎ/𝑑𝑎𝑦 + 𝑀𝐴𝑁$                                    (10) 
𝐶𝑂𝑆𝑇$/𝑑𝑎𝑦 =  𝐻ℎ𝑎𝑠ℎ/𝑠  ∗  𝐸𝑓𝑓𝑘𝑊ℎ∗𝑠
ℎ𝑎𝑠ℎ
 ∗ 𝐶𝐸 $
𝑘𝑊ℎ
∗ 24ℎ/𝑑𝑎𝑦 + 𝑀𝐴𝑁$                                (11) 
According to the competitive market economic theories, the ratio between the cost and 
profit functions must lead to the price under equilibrium condition (12): 
𝑃$/𝐵𝑇𝐶 = 
𝐶𝑂𝑆𝑇 $
𝑑𝑎𝑦
𝑃𝑅𝑂𝐹𝐼𝑇𝐵𝑇𝐶
𝑑𝑎𝑦
                                                                                                        (12) 
It is important to point out that an historical price below the one predicted by the model 
would force a miner out of the market, since he is operating in loss, but at the same time, the 
removal of its devices from the network increases others marginal profits (competition 
decreases) and at the end the system would return to equilibrium. 
On the other hand, an historical price higher than what predicted by the model attracts 
more miners, thus increases the number of devices operating in the network and this decreases 
others marginal profits (competition increases). Again, the system would return in balance
24
. 
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2.1.2 Data 
In the following table I present the sources used to collect and compute the required 
information. 
Table 2: Sources 
VARIABLES SOURCES 
𝑃ℎ𝑖𝑠𝑡 $ Historical price in US dollar 
Bitcoinvisuals.com 
𝐻ℎ𝑎𝑠ℎ/𝑠 Hashrate 
𝐵𝑅𝐵𝑇𝐶 Block Reward 
D Difficulty 
𝐵𝑇𝑠 Block Time Computed using D and 𝐻ℎ𝑎𝑠ℎ/𝑠 
𝐹𝐸𝐸𝑆𝐵𝑇𝐶 Transaction Fees https://charts.Bitcoin.com/bch/ 
𝐶𝐸$/𝑘𝑊ℎ Cost of Energy 
Computed using data from: 
en.Bitcoin.it/wiki/Mining_hardware_comparison 
 
https://en.Bitcoin.it/wiki/Non-
specialized_hardware_comparison 
 
https://archive.org/web/ 
 
𝑀𝐴𝑁$ Hardware maintaining cost 
𝐸𝐹𝐹𝐽/ℎ𝑎𝑠ℎ Hardware energy efficiency 
Source: Author’s elaboration 
I start my analysis by constructing a hardware sample that evolves during a chosen time 
window (2010-2018), which is divided in semesters associated with the introduction of a 
particular device. 
Table 3: Hardware sample 
TYPE MODEL TIME 
EFF. 
(Mhash/J) 
PRICE 
(USD) 
LIFESPAN 
before '17 after '17 
GPU ATI FirePro M5800 2 s. 2010 1,45 175 2880 1440 
GPU 
Saphire Radeon 5750 
Vapor-X 
2 s. 2010 1,35 160 2880 1440 
GPU GTX460 2 s. 2010 1,73 200 2880 1440 
GPU FirePro V5800 1 s. 2011 2,08 469 2880 1440 
FPGA 
Avnet Spartan-6 
LX150T 
2 s. 2011 6,25 995 1010 505 
FPGA AMD Radeon 7900 1 s. 2012 10,40 680 1010 505 
FPGA 
Bitcoin Dominator 
X5000 
2 s. 2012 14,70 750 1010 505 
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FPGA X6500 1 s. 2013 23,25 989 1010 505 
ASIC Avalon 1 2 s. 2013 107,00 1.299 540 270 
ASIC Bitman AntMiner S1 1 s. 2014 500,00 1.685 540 270 
ASIC Bitman AntMiner S2 2 s. 2014 900,00 2.259 540 270 
ASIC Bitman AntMiner S3 1 s. 2015 1.300,00 1.350 540 270 
ASIC Bitman AntMiner S4 2 s. 2015 1.429,00 1.400 540 270 
ASIC Bitman AntMiner S5 1 s. 2016 1.957,00 1.350 540 270 
ASIC Bitman AntMiner S5+ 2 s. 2016 2.257,00 2.307 540 270 
ASIC Bitman AntMiner S7 1 s. 2017 4.000,00 1.832 540 270 
ASIC Bitman AntMiner S9 2 s. 2017 10.182,00 2.400 540 270 
ASIC Ebit E9++ 1 s. 2018 10.500,00 3.880 540 270 
ASIC Ebit E10 2 s. 2018 11.100,00 5.230 540 270 
Source: Author’s elaboration 
Since the first Bitcoin was traded, there has been an evolution of the devices used by 
miners. The first ones adopted were GPU (Graphical Processing Unit), later FPGA (Field-
Programmable Gate Array) but these days only ASIC (Application-Specific Integrated 
Circuit) are suitable for mining purposes. 
For each device model I collect the efficiency, expressed in Mhash/J, and the dollar price 
at the release day. 
Technical data were collected from the Wikipedia pages 
https://en.Bitcoin.it/wiki/Mining_hardware_comparison and https://en.Bitcoin.it/wiki/Non-
specialized_hardware_comparison by using in addition the online archive 
https://archive.org/web/ , which allows to recover different webpages at the date in which they 
were modified, enabling the comparison before and after reviews
25
. 
Since only ASIC devices were created with specifications to mining purpose, there is 
homogeneity among FPGA and especially among GPU hardware. Due to this fact and 
considering the difficulty to recover the release prices, I make some simplify assumptions 
about them based on the information available online. This means that given the same 
computational power, I suppose prices homogeneity among devices when they were not 
available for particular models
26
. 
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Given the hardware sample, I construct a weights distribution matrix that represents the 
evolution of the devices used during each semester of my time window, which are replaced 
following a substitution rate that increases over time (see Appendix, Table A.1). In fact until 
2012, before FPGA took roots, it is equal 0,05; until 2016 I set it equal 0,1 and in the last two 
years of my analysis it is equal 0,15
27
. 
All my computations are based on this matrix, indeed I multiplied it by a specific column 
of the hardware sample table to obtain the biannual Efficiency (J/Hash), Weighted Devices’ 
Prices ($) and Weighted Lifespans (see Table A.2, A.3 and A.4 in the Appendix section). 
Regarding this latter matrix, I made further assumptions on the device lifespans by 
implementing what Abbatemarco et al. (2018) supposed in their research paper. I hence set a 
lifespan equal to 2880 days for GPU, 1010 days for FPGA and 540 days for ASIC but after 
2017, due to a supposed market growth phase, I halved these numbers (Table 3). 
Even to evaluate the cost of energy I follow the assumptions suggested by the researchers 
and I divide the world into two parts relative to Europe: Est and West, each one with a fix 
electricity price equal to 0,04 and 0,175 $/kWh respectively. The weights’ evolution of the 
mining pool is set up in 2010 equal to 0,7 for the West part an 0,3 for the Est part and it 
changes progressively until reaching in 2018 a 0,2 for the West ad 0,8 for the Est. I obtained a 
biannual cost of energy evolution measured by $/kWh by multiplying the biannual weights to 
the electricity costs and summing up the value for the West and the Est (see Appendix, Table 
A.5). 
At this point, to smooth the values across my time window, I take the differences between: 
𝑏𝑖𝑎𝑛𝑛𝑢𝑎𝑙𝑀𝐴𝑁$, 𝑏𝑖𝑎𝑛𝑛𝑢𝑎𝑙𝐸𝐹𝐹𝐽/𝐻𝑎𝑠ℎand 𝑏𝑖𝑎𝑛𝑛𝑢𝑎𝑙𝐶𝐸$/𝑘𝑊ℎ at time t and t-1 and I divide 
these values by the number of days in each semester, obtaining DeltaMAN, DeltaEFF and 
DeltaCE (see Appendix, Table A.6). Starting the first day of my analysis with the first value 
of the biannual matrixes, I compute the final variables as follows: 
𝑀𝐴𝑁$(𝑡) =  𝑀𝐴𝑁$ (𝑡 − 1) + 𝐷𝑒𝑙𝑡𝑎𝑀𝐴𝑁                                                                      (13) 
𝐸𝐹𝐹 𝐽
ℎ𝑎𝑠ℎ
(𝑡) =  𝐸𝐹𝐹𝐽/ℎ𝑎𝑠ℎ (𝑡 − 1) + 𝐷𝑒𝑙𝑡𝑎𝐸𝐹𝐹                                                              (14) 
𝐶𝐸 $
𝑘𝑊ℎ
(𝑡) =  𝐶𝐸 $
𝑘𝑊ℎ
(𝑡 − 1) + 𝐷𝑒𝑙𝑡𝑎𝐶𝐸                                                                         (15) 
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By applying the previous formulas
28
 I obtain the model price
29
 and compare its evolution 
to the historical one (Figure 7). 
Figure 7: Historical Market Price vs. Implied Model Price (July 2010-December 2018) 
 
Source: Author’s elaboration 
The evolution of the model (or implied) price shows a spike during the second semester of 
2016 and this is due to the fact that on the 10
th
 July 2016 the Block Reward helved from 25 to 
12,5, leading to a reduction on the profit side and a consequent price increase. 
Despite this episode, the historical price seems to fluctuate around the implied until the 
beginning of 2017, period in which Bitcoin price started raising exponentially reaching its 
peak with a value equal 19.270$ on the 19
th
 December 2017. It declined during 2018, 
converging again to the model price. 
Another divergence was detected at the end of 2013 but it was of a lower amount and 
resolved quickly. 
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 Recall: 
𝑃𝑅𝑂𝐹𝐼𝑇𝐵𝑇𝐶
𝑑𝑎𝑦
= 𝐵𝑅𝐵𝑇𝐶 ∗ [
3600𝑠
ℎ
∗24 ℎ
𝑑𝑎𝑦
𝐵𝑇𝑠
] + 𝐹𝐸𝐸𝑆𝐵𝑇𝐶                                                                                         (8) 
𝐶𝑂𝑆𝑇 $
𝑑𝑎𝑦
=  𝐻ℎ𝑎𝑠ℎ
𝑠
 ∗  𝐸𝑓𝑓𝑘𝑊ℎ∗𝑠
ℎ𝑎𝑠ℎ
 ∗ 𝐶𝐸 $
𝑘𝑊ℎ
∗ 24 ℎ
𝑑𝑎𝑦
+ 𝑀𝐴𝑁$                                                                       (11) 
 
𝑃$/𝐵𝑇𝐶 = 
𝐶𝑂𝑆𝑇 $
𝑑𝑎𝑦
𝑃𝑅𝑂𝐹𝐼𝑇𝐵𝑇𝐶
𝑑𝑎𝑦
                                                                                                                                     (12) 
29
 In Table A.8 in the Appendix section I display all the variables required to compute the model price and I 
compare it with the historical price. Since my time window involves 3107 observation days, I decide to simplify 
the presentation by showing only the results for the last day of each month. 
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2.2 Econometric Approach 
Given the historical and implied price series, I want to make a further step than what Hayes 
and Abbatemarco et al. (2018) did, by including in my analysis time frame even the 
divergence phase. Therefore, I consider the period from the 9
th
 April 2014 to the 31
st
 
December 2018
30
. 
I start with some unit root tests to verify if the series are stationary in level or need to be 
integrated (paragraph 2.2.1) and later I identify the proper number of lags to be included in 
the model (paragraph 2.2.2). I check for the presence of a cointegrating relationship to verify 
whether I should adopt a Vector Error Correction Model (VECM) or a Vector Autoregression 
(VAR) model (paragraph 2.2.3). The results suggest that a VAR model is the best suited for 
my data, hence I display the final result of my analysis (paragraph 2.2.4) and try to improve 
the outcomes by correcting the heteroscedasticity in my regressions (paragraph 2.2.5). 
2.2.1 Unit Root tests 
The first step in my analysis is to determine with different unit root tests whether the time 
series is stationary or not. The presence of a unit root indicates that a process is characterized 
by time-dependent variance and violates the weak stationarity condition
31
. 
I test the presence of a unit root with three procedures: the augmented Dickey-Fuller 
(1979) test, the Phillips-Perron (1988) test and the Zivot-Andrews (1992) test. 
Given a time series {𝑦𝑡}, both the augmented Dickey-Fuller test and the Phillips-Perron 
test are based on the general regression (16): 
∆𝑦𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛽𝑡 + 𝜃𝑦𝑡−1 + 𝛿1∆𝑦𝑡−1 + ⋯+ 𝛿𝑝−1∆𝑦𝑡−𝑝+1 + 𝜀𝑡                                        (16) 
Where 𝛼 is the constant, 𝑡 is the time trend, and 𝑝 is the order of the autoregressive 
process
32
. 
For both tests, the null hypothesis is that the time series contains a unit root, thus it is not 
stationary (𝐻0: 𝜃 = 0) while the alternative hypothesis asserts stationarity (𝐻0: 𝜃 < 0).  
Considering only the augmented Dickey-Fuller test, its basic idea is that if a series {𝑦𝑡} is 
stationary, then {∆𝑦𝑡} can be explained only by the information included in its lagged values 
(∆𝑦𝑡−1 … ∆𝑦𝑡−𝑝+1) and not from those in 𝑦𝑡−1. 
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 I select this time window also to base the analysis on solid data. As written in paragraph 2.1, due to the 
difficulty to obtain reliable information on the hardware used in the mining process, I make some simplified 
assumptions on their features. By choosing this time window I include the hardware sample whose data are more 
precise. 
31
 The condition of weak stationarity asserts that 𝑉𝑎𝑟(𝑟𝑡) = 𝛾𝑜, which means that the variance of the process is 
time invariant and equal to a finite constant. 
32
 Boffelli, S., Urga, G., (2016). Financial Econometrics Using Stata. 
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For each variable I conduct this test firstly with a constant term and later by including also 
a trend
33
. 
The result can be read by looking at the p-value or by comparing the test statistic with its 
critical value. Therefore, the null hypothesis of unit root can be rejected if the value of the test 
statistic is higher than the 5% critical value in absolute terms or, equivalently, if the p-value is 
below 5%.  Table 4 presents the main findings of the test. 
Table 4: Augmented Dickey-Fuller test 
 
Augmented Dickey-Fuller test 
 
constant constant+trend 
result 
 
t-stat p-value t-stat p-value 
lnPrice -0,606 0,8696 -1,839 0,6856 NO stationary 
lnModelPrice -0,467 0,8982 -1,669 0,7644 NO stationary 
ΔlnPrice -7,694 0,0000 -7,697 0,0000 stationary 
ΔlnModelPrice -8,041 0,0000 -8,038 0,0000 stationary 
 
critical values 
constant constant + trend 
1% 5% 10% 1% 5% 10% 
-3,430 -2,860 -2,570 -3,960 -3,410 -3,120 
Source: Author’s elaboration 
The Phillips-Perron test points out that the process generating 𝑦𝑡 might have a higher order 
of autocorrelation than the one admitted in the test equation. This test corrects the issue and it 
is robust in case of unspecified autocorrelation or heteroscedasticity in the disturbance term of 
the equation. Table 5 displays the test results. 
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 In order to select the proper number of lags to include in this test I used, only for this part of my analysis, 
Gretl, which is an open-source statistical software. Its advantage is to apply clearly the Schwert criterion for the 
maximum lag (𝑝𝑚𝑎𝑥) estimation, which is given by: 
𝑝𝑚𝑎𝑥 = 𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑔𝑒𝑟 𝑝𝑎𝑟𝑡 𝑜𝑓 [12 ∗ (
𝑇
100
)
1/4
] 
Where 𝑇 is the number of observations. 
The test is conducted firstly with the suggested value of 𝑝𝑚𝑎𝑥  but if the absolute value of the t-statistic for testing 
the significance of the last lagged value is below the threshold 1,6, 𝑝𝑚𝑎𝑥  is reduced by one and the analysis is 
recomputed. The process stops at the first maximum lag that returns a value greater than 1,6. When this value is 
found, the augmented Dickey-Fuller test is estimates. 
Even if Gretl outputs are identical to those presented by Stata, I decide to display the latter since I conduct my 
entire analysis with this software. 
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Table 5: Phillips-Perron test 
 
Phillips-Perron test 
 
constant constant+trend 
result 
 
t-stat p-value t-stat p-value 
lnPrice -0,437 0,9037 -1,546 0,8130 NO stationary 
lnModelPrice -0,637 0,8624 -1,805 0,7021 NO stationary 
ΔlnPrice -34,394 0,0000 -34,385 0,0000 stationary 
ΔlnModelPrice -42,972 0,0000 -42,959 0,0000 stationary 
 
critical values 
constant constant + trend 
1% 5% 10% 1% 5% 10% 
-3,430 -2,860 -2,570 -3,960 -3,410 -3,120 
Source: Author’s elaboration 
The main difference between these tests is that the latter applies Newey and West (1987) 
standard errors to take into account serial correlation, while the augmented Dickey-Fuller test  
introduces additional lags of the first difference. 
Since the previous tests do not allow for the possibility of a structural break in the series, 
Zivot and Andrews propose a way to examine the presence of a unit root including the chance 
of an unknown date of a break-point in the series. They propose three models to test for the 
presence of a unit root considering a one-time structural break: 
a) permits a one-time change in the intercept of the series: 
∆𝑦𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛽𝑡 + 𝜃𝑦𝑡−1 + 𝛾𝐷𝑈𝑡 + 𝛿1∆𝑦𝑡−1 + ⋯+ 𝛿𝑝−1∆𝑦𝑡−𝑝+1 + 𝜀𝑡                      (17) 
b) permits a one-time change in the slope of the trend function: 
∆𝑦𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛽𝑡 + 𝜃𝑦𝑡−1 + 𝜗𝐷𝑇𝑡 + 𝛿1∆𝑦𝑡−1 + ⋯+ 𝛿𝑝−1∆𝑦𝑡−𝑝+1 + 𝜀𝑡                      (18) 
c) combines the previous models: 
∆𝑦𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛽𝑡 + 𝜃𝑦𝑡−1 + 𝛾𝐷𝑈𝑡 + 𝜗𝐷𝑇𝑡 + 𝛿1∆𝑦𝑡−1 + ⋯+ 𝛿𝑝−1∆𝑦𝑡−𝑝+1 + 𝜀𝑡        (19) 
Where 𝐷𝑈𝑡 is a dummy variable relates to a mean shift at a given break-date, while 𝐷𝑇𝑡 is 
a trend shift variable. 
The null hypothesis, which is the same for all three models, states that the series contains a 
unit root (𝐻0: 𝜃 = 0), while the alternative hypothesis asserts that the series is a stationary 
process with a one-time break occurring at an unknown point in time (𝐻0: 𝜃 < 0)
34
. 
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 Waheed, M., Alam, T., Ghauri, S. P. (2006). Structural breaks and unit root: evidence from Pakistani 
macroeconomic time series. 
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Table 6: Zivot-Andrews test 
 
Zitov-Andrews test 
 
 
intercept trend intercept + trend 
result 
 
t-stat break date t-stat break date t-stat break date 
lnPrice -2,964 1083 26/03/2017 -2,049 261 25/12/2014 -2,562 1196 17/07/2017 NON stationary 
lnModelPrice -3,221 281 14/01/2015 -3,357 408 21/05/2015 -3,914 620 19/12/2015 NON stationary 
ΔlnPrice -34,905 1350 18/12/2017 -34.626 1285 14/10/2017 -34,895 1350 18/12/2017 stationary 
ΔlnModelPrice -42,848 582 11/11/2015 -42,781 1469 16/04/2018 -42,858 582 11/11/2015 stationary 
critical values 
intercept trend intercept + trend 
1% 5% 10% 1% 5% 10% 1% 5% 10% 
-5,34 -4,8 -4,58 -4,93 -4,42 -4,11 -5,57 -5,08 -4,82 
Source: Author’s elaboration 
The results in Table 6 confirm what the other tests predict: both series are integrated of 
order 1. 
Since this last test identifies for ΔlnPrice the presence of a structural break on the 18th 
December 2017 and after this date the Bitcoin price reaches its higher value to start declining 
later, I add to my analysis a dummy variable related to this observation
35
. The graphs of these 
series are plotted in Figure A.1 of the Appendix section. 
2.2.2 Identify the number of lags 
To identify the proper lag length to be included in the VAR model I use the “varsoc” 
command in Stata that displays a table of test statistics, which reports for each lag length, the 
log of the likelihood functions (LL), a likelihood-ratio test statistic with the related degrees of 
freedom and p-value (LR, df and p) and also four information criteria: Akaike’s final 
prediction error (FPE); Akaike’s information criterion (AIC), Hannan and Quinn’s 
information criterion (HQIC) and Schwarz’s Bayesian information criterion (SBIC)36. 
The preferred lag length is the one that generates the lowest value of the information 
statistic considered, which is highlighted by Stata with a *. 
Since the output is sensitive to the maximum lag considered I try different option by 
changing the one included in the command computation
37
.  After selecting a maximum lag 
length equal to 16, the optimal number of lags suggested changes: while the previous results 
agree recommending 1 lag with each information criteria, now the FPE and AIC diverge and 
propose 13 lags.  To solve this issue I follow Lütkepohl’s intuition that “the SBIC and HQIC 
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 A dummy variable allows taking into account a broken linear trend in a series. 
36
 Every information criteria provide a trade-off between the complexity (e.g. the number of parameters) and the 
goodness of fit (based on the likelihood function) of a model. 
37
 I tried with 4, 8, 12, 16, 20 and 24 lags. 
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provide consistent estimates of the true lag order, while the FPE and AIC overestimate the 
lag order with positive probability”38. Therefore I select 1 lags to move forward with my 
analysis. 
Table 7: Proper number of lags 
lag LL LR df p FPE AIC HQIC SBIC 
0 7160.95 
   
8.0e-07 -8.36581 -8.3611 -8.35308 
1 7190.57 59.237 4 0.000 7.7e-07 -8.39575 -8.38633* -8.37029* 
2 7192.42 3.7134 4 0.446 7.8e-07 -8.39325 -8.37911 -8.35506 
3 7194.48 4.1059 4 0.392 7.8e-07 -8.39097 -8.37231 -8.34005 
4 7195.74 2.5346 4 0.638 7.8e-07 -8.38778 -8.36422 -8.32413 
5 7197.81 4.1319 4 0.388 7.8e-07 -8.38552 -8.35725 -8.30914 
6 7199.73 3.8486 4 0.427 7.8e-07 -8.38309 -8.35011 -8.29399 
7 7201.63 3.8014 4 0.434 7.9e-07 -8.38064 -8.34295 -8.2788 
8 7204.56 5.8468 4 0.211 7.9e-07 -8.37938 -8.33698 -8.26482 
9 7208.36 7.6003 4 0.107 7.9e-07 -8.37914 -8.33204 -8.25185 
10 7212.23 7.7429 4 0.101 7.9e-07 -8.37899 -8.32717 -8.23897 
11 7213.48 2.5086 4 0.643 7.9e-07 -8.37578 -8.31925 -8.22304 
12 7225.63 24.303 4 0.000 7.8e-07 -8.38531 -8.32407 -8.21983 
13 7243.57 35.872* 4 0.000 7.7e-07* -8.4016* -8.33565 -8.2234 
14 7244.29 1.4495 4 0.836 7.7e-07 -8.39777 -8.32711 -8.20684 
15 7246.50 4.4025 4 0.354 7.7e-07 -8.39567 -8.3203 -8.19201 
16 7248.86 4.7357 4 0.316 7.8e-07 -8.39376 -8.31368 -8.17737 
Source: Author’s elaboration 
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 Becketti, S., (2013). Introduction to Time Series Using Stata. 
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2.2.3 Identify the number of cointegrating relationships 
A cointegrating relationship is a relationship that describes the long-term link among the 
levels of a number of the nonstationary variables. Given K nonstationary variables, they can 
have at most K-1 cointegrating relationships. Therefore in my analysis, since I have only two 
nonstationary variables (lnPrice and lnModelPrice), I could obtain, at most, only one 
cointegrating relationship. 
If series show cointegration, a Vector Autoregression (VAR) Model is no more the best 
suited one for the analysis but it is better to implement a Vector Error-Correction Model 
(VECM), which can be written as (20): 
∆у𝑡 = 𝜇 + 𝛿𝑡 + 𝛼𝛽
′у𝑡−1 + ∑ 𝛤𝑖∆у𝑡−𝑖 + 𝜀𝑡
𝑝−1
𝑖=1                                                                 (20) 
Where the deterministic components 𝜇 + 𝛿𝑡 are respectively the linear and the quadratic 
trend
39
 in 𝑦𝑡 that can be separated into the proper trends in 𝑦𝑡 and those of the cointegrating 
relationship. 
Therefore: 
𝜇 ≡ 𝛼𝜈 + 𝛾                  and                𝛿𝑡 = 𝛼𝜌𝑡 +  𝜏𝑡 
By substituting in the previous expression, the VECM can be expressed as (21): 
∆у𝑡 = 𝛼(𝛽
′у𝑡−1 + 𝜈 + 𝜌𝑡) + ∑ 𝛤𝑖∆у𝑡−𝑖 + 𝛾 + 𝜏𝑡 + 𝜀𝑡
𝑝−1
𝑖=1                                              (21) 
Where the first part 𝛼(𝛽′у𝑡−1 + 𝜈 + 𝜌𝑡) represents the cointegrating equations, while the 
second ∑ 𝛤𝑖∆у𝑡−𝑖 + 𝛾 + 𝜏𝑡 + 𝜀𝑡
𝑝−1
𝑖=1  refers to the variables in levels. 
This representation allows specifying 5 cases that Stata tests
40
: 
1) Unrestricted trend: allows for quadratic trend in the level of 𝑦𝑡 (𝜏𝑡 appears in the equation) 
and states that the cointegrating equations are trend stationary, which means they are 
stationary around time trends; 
2) Restricted trend (𝜏 = 0): excludes quadratic trends but includes linear trends (𝜌𝑡). As in 
the previous case, it allows the cointegrating equations to be trend stationary; 
3) Unrestricted constant (𝜏 = 0, 𝜌 = 0): lets linear trends in 𝑦𝑡 to present a linear trend (𝛾) 
but the cointegrating equations are stationary around a constant means (𝜈); 
4) Restricted constant (𝜏 = 0, 𝜌 = 0, 𝛾 = 0): rules out any trends in the levels of the data but 
the cointegrating relationships are stationary around a constant mean (𝜈); 
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 This depends on the fact that in a first-difference equation: a constant term is a linear trend in the level of the 
variables (𝑦𝑡 = 𝜅 + 𝜆𝑡  𝛥𝑦𝑡 = 𝜆); while a linear trend derives from the quadratic one in the regression in 
levels (𝑦𝑡 = 𝜅 + 𝜆𝑡 + 𝜔𝑡
2 𝛥𝑦𝑡 = 𝜆 + 2𝜔𝑡 − 𝜔). 
40
 See Becketti, S., (2013). Introduction to Time Series Using Stata. 
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5) No trend (𝜏 = 0, 𝜌 = 0, 𝛾 = 0, 𝜈 = 0): considers no nonzero means or trends. 
Starting from these different specifications, the Johansen test can detect the presence of a 
cointegrating relationship in the analysis. The null hypothesis states, again, that there are no 
cointegrating relationships against the alternative that the null is not true. 𝐻0 is rejected if the 
trace statistic is higher than the 5% critical value. 
I run the test with each case specification and the results agree to detect zero cointegrating 
equations (a maximum rank of zero)
41
. This means that the two time series could be fitted into 
a Vector Autoregression (VAR) model. 
2.2.4 Vector Autoregression (VAR) Model 
The Vector Autoregression (VAR) model allows investigating the interaction of several 
endogenous time series that mutually influence each other. In my analysis I do not only want 
to detect if Bitcoin price could be determine by the one suggested by the cost of production 
model but I want also to check if the price has an influence on the model price. This latter 
relation can occur if, for example, a price increase leads to a higher cost for the mining 
hardware. In fact, a raise in the price represents also a higher reward if the mining process is 
successfully conducted, with the risk to push hardware price atop, which in turns could boost 
the model price up. 
To explain how a VAR model is constructed, I present a simple univariate AR(p) model, 
disregarding any possible exogenous variables, which can be written as
42
 (22): 
𝑦𝑡 = 𝜇 + 𝜙1𝑦𝑡−1 + ⋯+ 𝜙𝑝𝑦𝑡−𝑝 + 𝜀𝑡                                                                             (22) 
Or, in a concise form (23): 
𝜙(𝐿)𝑦𝑡 = 𝜇 + 𝜀𝑡                                                                                                              (23) 
where 𝑦𝑡 depends on its p prior values, a constant (𝜇) and a random disturbance (𝜀𝑡). 
A vector of n jointly endogenous variables is express as (24): 
у𝑡 = [
𝑦1,𝑡
𝑦2,𝑡
⋮
𝑦𝑛,𝑡
]                                                                                                                      (24) 
  
                                                          
41
 Only the unrestricted trend does not display any conclusion from the test but since the other results matched, I 
consider rank=0 the right solution. Results are displayed in Table A.9 in the Appendix section. 
42
 Becketti, S., (2013). Introduction to Time Series Using Stata. 
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This n-element vector can be rearranged as a function (25) of n constants, p prior values of 𝑌𝑡 
and a vector of n random disturbances, 𝜖𝑡: 
у𝑡 = 𝜇 + Ф1у𝑡−1 + ⋯+ Ф𝑝у𝑡−𝑝 + 𝜖𝑡                                                                            (25) 
Where 𝜇 is a vector (26) of the n-constants: 
𝜇 = [
𝜇1
𝜇2
⋮
𝜇𝑝
]                                                                                                                         (26) 
the matrix of coefficients Ф𝑖 is (27): 
Ф1 =
[
 
 
 
𝜙𝑖,11 𝜙𝑖,12 ⋯ 𝜙𝑖,1𝑛
𝜙𝑖,21 𝜙𝑖,22 ⋯ 𝜙𝑖,2𝑛
⋮ ⋮ ⋱ ⋮
𝜙𝑖,𝑛1 𝜙𝑖,𝑛2 … 𝜙𝑖,𝑛𝑛]
 
 
 
                                                                                     (27) 
and 𝜖𝑡 consists in (28): 
𝜖𝑡 = [
𝜀1
𝜀2
⋮
𝜀𝑝
]                                                                                                                        (28) 
With      𝛦𝜖𝑡 = 0     and       𝛦𝜖𝑡𝜖′𝑠 = {
𝛴, 𝑡 = 𝑠
0, 𝑡 ≠ 𝑠
 
the elements of 𝜖𝑡 can be contemporaneously correlated. 
Given these specifications, a pth-order VAR can be presented as
43
 (29): 
Ф(𝐿)у𝑡 = 𝜇 + 𝜖𝑡                                                                                                              (29) 
To clarify this expression, the ith endogenous time series can be extracted from these basic 
VAR and be represented as (30): 
        𝑦𝑖,𝑡 = 𝜇𝑖 + 𝜙1,𝑖1𝑦1,𝑡−1 + ⋯+ 𝜙1,𝑖𝑛𝑦𝑛,𝑡−1 
            +𝜙2,𝑖1𝑦1,𝑡−2 + ⋯+ 𝜙2,𝑖𝑛𝑦𝑛,𝑡−2 + ⋯                                                                    (30) 
                    +𝜙𝑝,𝑖1𝑦1,𝑡−𝑝 + ⋯+ +𝜙𝑝,𝑖𝑛𝑦𝑛,𝑡−𝑝 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡 
The result of the Vector Autoregression (VAR) model considering the dummy variable is: 
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 Recall: Ф(𝐿) ≡ 𝛪 − Ф1(𝐿) − ⋯ − Ф𝑝(𝐿) 
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Table 8:Regressions of the Vector Autoregression model 
  (1) (2) 
VARIABLES dlnPrice dlnModelPrice 
      
L.dlnPrice 0.18330223*** 0.00799770 
 
(0.02359822) (0.02055802) 
L.dlnModelPrice -0.00655017 -0.02899205 
 
(0.02762476) (0.02406582) 
dummy -0.00588960*** 0.00027999 
 
(0.00185465) (0.00161571) 
Constant 0.00236755*** 0.00149779** 
 
(0.00086910) (0.00075713) 
   Observations 1,726 1,726 
R-squared 0.04178812 0.00092579 
Standard errors in parentheses 
 *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
Source: Author’s elaboration 
As expected the dummy is significant in the dlnPrice function but not in dlnModelPrice. 
Looking at the significance of the parameters we can see how dlnPrice depends on its 
lagged value, on the dummy and on the constant term but it seems not to be linked with the 
lagged value of dlnModelPrice. The regression of dlnModelPrice appears not to be explained 
by any variable considered in the model. 
I proceed in my analysis by checking the stationarity of the model. The results confirm the 
model is stable and there is no residual autocorrelation
44
. 
2.2.5 Heteroscedasticity correction 
Given the series’ path and the daily frequency of the data, the variables included in the 
model are probably heteroskedastic. This feature does not compromise the unbiasedness or 
the consistency of the OLS coefficients but invalidates the usual standard errors. 
In time series analysis, heteroscedasticity is usually neglected, as the autocorrelation of the 
error terms is seen as the main problem due to its ability to invalidate the analysis. 
Since is not possible to check and correct heteroscedasticity while performing the VAR 
model I run each VAR regression separately and check the presence of heteroscedasticity by 
running the Breusch-Pagan test, whose null hypothesis states that the error variance are all 
equal (homoscedasticity) against the alternative hypothesis that the error variances change 
over time (heteroscedasticity). 
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𝐻0: 𝜎1
2 = 𝜎2
2 = ⋯ = 𝜎2 
The null hypothesis is rejected if the probability value of the chi-square statistic 
(Prob<chi2) is less than 0.05. 
Table A.11 in the Appendix section shows the results of the test for both regressions: the 
null hypothesis is always rejected, implying the presence of heteroscedasticity in the 
residuals.  
I try therefore to correct the issue using heteroscedasticity-robust standard errors, provided 
by Stata with the command “robust”. The final results are displayed in Table 9. 
Table 9: Regressions with robust standard errors 
  (1) (2) 
VARIABLES dlnPrice dlnModelPrice 
      
L.dlnPrice 0.18330223*** 0.00799770 
 
(0.04306718) (0.01592745) 
L.dlnModelPrice -0.00655017 -0.02899205*** 
 
(0.02681078) (0.00979148) 
dummy -0.00588960*** 0.00027999 
 
(0.00225058) (0.00142356) 
Constant 0.00236755*** 0.00149779* 
 
(0.00078480) (0.00078942) 
   Observations 1,726 1,726 
R-squared 0.04178812 0.00092579 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
Source: Author’s elaboration 
These new robust standard errors are different from the standard errors estimated with the 
VAR model, while the coefficients are unchanged. The first difference of lnPrice depends 
even in this case on its lag, but, contrary from the VAR, now the first difference of 
lnModelPrice is not independent from its previous values. This new specification confirms 
the previous finding that each variable does not depend on the lagged value of the other one. 
Therefore, it seems that during the time window considered the Bitcoin historical price is not 
connected with the price derived by Hayes’ formulation, and vice versa. 
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2.2.6 Comment on the results 
Looking at Figure 7, it seems that the historical price fluctuated around the model (or 
implied) price until 2017, year in which Bitcoin price significantly increased. During the lasts 
months of 2018 the prices seem to converge again, following a common path. In my analysis I 
focus on the time window in which Bitcoin experienced its higher price volatility and my 
results suggest that it is disconnected from the one predicted by the model. These findings 
may depend on the particular features of the new cryptocurrencies, which have not been 
completely understood jet. 
The previous analysis, conducted on different time periods, by Hayes
45
 and Abbatemarco 
et al. (2018)
46
 assert that Bitcoin price could be justified by the costs and revenues of its 
blockchain network, leading to an opposite result than mine. 
I think the difference is based on the time window analyzed since I make a further step 
evaluating also the months in which Bitcoin price was pushed atop and did not follow a stable 
path. 
In my opinion there are not enough knowledge on cryptocurrencies to assert that Bitcoin 
price is (or is not) based on the profit and cost derived by the mining process but these 
intrinsic characteristics must be considered and check also in further analysis that include 
other possible Bitcoin price drivers suggested by the literature. 
For this reason I present in the following paragraph the literature behind the study of 
Bitcoin price formation, providing an overview on the main drivers considered by the 
researchers.  
2.3 Literature 
Kristoufek (2015)
47
 focuses on different sources of price movements by examining their 
interconnection during time. He considers three different categories: economics, transaction, 
technical drivers and interest. The results show how Bitcoin’s fundamental factors, such as 
usage, money supply and price level, drive its price over the long term. With regard to the 
technical drivers, a raising price encourages individuals to become miners but this effect 
eclipses over time, since always more specialized mining hardware have soured the difficulty 
up. Evidences show that price is driven by investors’ interest but with slightly different 
effects. During period of explosive prices, interest pushes it atop, while with period of 
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declining prices, interest decreases it at even a lower level. He concludes that Bitcoin is a 
unique asset with properties of both a speculative-financial asset, and a standard one and 
because of his dynamic nature and volatility, it is obvious to expect that its price drivers will 
change over time. 
The interest element seems to be particularly relevant when analyzing the behavior of 
Bitcoin price, leading many researchers to study its interconnection with Internet components, 
such as Google Trends, Wikipedia queries and Tweets.  
Kristoufek (2013)
48
, for example, tries to understand the relationship between Bitcoin price 
and two different search queries: Google Trends and Wikipedia. He discovers that a raise in 
the number of Google researches boost the cryptocurrency price, but this leads to an increase 
also for the general public interest and this cycle can trigger a bubble. He points out a 
fundamental difference between the research queries: a price shock yields to an immediate 
shift in the Google trend, while is connected to a permanent shift in the Wikipedia views. On 
the other hand, as the results show an immediate price shifts as a consequence of a change in 
the Google trend, this variation following a Wikipedia queries is not significant. To analyze 
this latter case, he separates the effect into positive and negative feedbacks. By doing so it is 
clearly shown how, when prices are going up, the number of researches on Wikipedia 
increases, while, when prices are decreasing, the public interest, measured as Wikipedia 
queries, is going even lower. In conclusion, this study finds a bidirectional relationship among 
Bitcoin price and queries: when the price is above the trend, interest increases souring the 
price further up. By looking at the opposite case, when the price is below the trend, the 
interest could push it even deeper. In both cases these behaviors could lead to a bubble 
behavior. 
Even Matta et al. (2015)
49
 investigate whether information searches and social media 
activities could predict Bitcoin price comparing its historical price to Google Trends data and 
volume of tweets. They used a dataset based only on 60 days but in addition to the other 
papers regarding the topic they implement an automated sentiment analysis technique that 
allows to automatically identify users’ opinions, evaluations, sentiments and attitudes on a 
particular topic. They use a tool called “SentiStrenght”, which is based on a dictionary only 
made by sentiment words, where each of them is linked to a weight representing a sentiment 
strength. Its aim is to evaluate the strength of sentiments in short messages that are analyzed 
separately, and the result is sum up in a single value: a positive, negative or neutral sentiment. 
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The study reveals a significant relationship between Bitcoin price and volumes of both, tweets 
and Google queries. 
Ciaian et al. (2015)
50
 adopt a different approach to identify the factors behind the Bitcoin 
price formation by studying both the digital and traditional ones. The authors point out the 
relevance of analyzing these factors simultaneously, otherwise the econometric outputs could 
be biased. To do so they specify three categories of determinants: market forces of supply and 
demand; attractiveness indicators (views on Wikipedia and number of new members and 
posts on a dedicated blog) and global macro-financial development. The results show that the 
relevant impact on price is driven by the first category and it tends to increase over time. 
About the second category they assert that the short-run changes on price following the first 
period after Bitcoin introduction are imputable to investors’ interest which is measured by 
online information search. Its impact eases off during time, having no impact in the long run 
and may be due to an increased trust among users who become more willing to adopt the 
digital currency. On the other hand, the results suggest that investor speculations can also 
affect Bitcoin price leading to a higher volatility that may cause price bubbles. To conclude, 
the study does not detect any correspondences between Bitcoin price and macroeconomics 
and financial factors. 
Garcia et al. (2014)
51
 study the evolution of Bitcoin price based on the interplay between 
different elements: historical price, volume of word-of-mouth communication in on-line 
social media (information sharing, measured by tweets and posts on Facebook), volume of 
information search (Google searches and Wikipedia queries) and user base growth. The 
results identify an interdependence between Bitcoin price and two signals that could form a 
potential price bubbles: the first concern the word-of-mouth effect, while the other is based on 
the number of adopters. The first feedback loop is a reinforcement cycle: Bitcoin interest 
increases leading to a higher search volume and social media activity. This new popularity 
encourages users to purchase the cryptocurrency driving the price further up. Again, this 
effect would raise the search volume. The second loop is the user adoption cycle: after 
acquiring information, new users joint the network, growing the user base. Demand raises but 
since supply cannot adjust immediately but changes linearly with time, Bitcoin price would 
sour up. 
Kjærland et al. (2018)
52
 try to identify the factors that have an impact on Bitcoin price 
formation. They argue that the harshrate, CBOE volatility index (VIX), oil, gold and Bitcoin 
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transaction volume do not affect Bitcoin price. The study shows that price depends on the 
returns on the S&P500, past price performance, optimism and Google searches. 
Bouoiyour J. and Selmi R. (2015)
53
 examine the links between Bitcoin price and its 
potential drivers by considering: investors’ attractiveness (measured by Google search 
queries); exchange-trade ratio; monetary velocity; estimated output volume; hashrate; gold 
price; and Shanghai market index. The latter value is due to the fact that Shanghai market is 
seen as the biggest player in Bitcoin economic, which could also drive its volatility. The 
evaluation period is the one from 5
th
 December 2010 to 14
th
 July 2014 and it is investigated 
through the adoption of an ARDL Bounds Testing method and a VEC Grander causality test. 
The results highlight the speculative nature of this cryptocurrency stating that there are poor 
chances that it becomes internationally recognized. 
An important study on Bitcoin drivers that does not consider the online queries is the one 
conducted by Van Wijk (2013)
54
.  He investigates, indeed, the closing value: of the exchange 
rate of the Bitcoin express in US dollar, of the Dow Jones Index, of the FTSE100 Index and 
of the Nikkei225 Index
55
. In addition he takes into account the exchange rates between the 
U.S dollar and both the Euro and the Yen, and adds three measurements variables concerning 
the oil prices: the Brent oil price, the West Texas Intermediate (WTI) oil price and the UBS 
Bloomberg Constant Maturity Commodity Index (CMCI) of Oil. The time window analyzed 
spans from the 19
th
 July 2010 until 13
th
 June 2013 and the author implements an Error 
Correction model. The results show that in the long run, the price of Bitcoin is affected by the 
value of the Dow Jones, the euro-dollar exchange rate and the WTI oil price. Moreover, Dow 
Jones Index has a significant effect even in the short run. Van Wijk concludes his work 
pointing out that the influencing values are related to the US economy and suggests taking 
care of their path while investigating Bitcoin price. 
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Section 3 
Despite the high volatility characterizing Bitcoin, the interest that this new form of money 
has drawn to itself leads the financial institutions to contemplate new forms of payment and to 
a renewal of the banking sector. In the last years has caught on the hypothesis about the 
possibility that central banks issue their own digital currencies (in the form of 
cryptocurrencies or not). After a brief overview of the development framework, I present how 
these new forms of money guaranteed by central banks may look like and their possible future 
applications. I conclude by addressing some examples of states trying to deal with this new 
topic. 
3.1 Sovereign Digital Currency Development Framework 
Nowadays, sovereign fiat moneys (cash and reserves) issued by central banks, and which 
are their tools to influence the money creation through bank deposits, are competing with 
privately issued cryptocurrencies (such as Bitcoin) but in the future they may also enter into 
competition with sovereign, digital currencies issued by other central banks. 
In the event that private cryptocurrencies become widely used, central banks’ capability to 
control the monetary power would be harmed, but a proper design of new digital cash 
guaranteed by banks could enlarge their influence on the money supply. The introduction of 
central bank digital currency (CBDC) has the potential to shake the structure of the financial 
system. In fact, just to make an example, if costumers decide to switch their savings from 
bank accounts to new form of digital monies, the banks’ ability to provide cash in a traditional 
way would be affected
56
. 
Private cryptocurrencies have not yet become money in the strict sense since they cannot 
fulfill the three basic requirements: be used as a means of payment, unit of account and store 
of value. These functions can be satisfied only if they become universally accepted and are 
perceived as stable with a predictable value. 
Moreover, cash, as an established payment instrument, exhibits a lower risk of fraud 
compare private cryptocurrencies, which lack legal frameworks and are often subject to 
security breaches at wallet providers. Therefore CBDCs, in order to meet cash’s safety level, 
must be issued by reliable authorities. 
Central bank digital currencies (CBDC) may take the advantage to be adopted in a fast way 
since states and regulation could support them by forcing transactions denominated in these 
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currencies, for example by demanding tax payments in crypto-euros. This can facilitate the 
creation of a captive consumer base. 
If regulation, on the other hand, does not force the adoption of a CBDC, individuals can 
autonomously decide among payments systems, therefore CBDCs must satisfy many 
requirements in terms of price, safety and convenience to become the preferable one, 
With regard to price, this new crypto-euro must ensure the absence (or a paltry amount) of 
additional fees for both, the consumers, who should be allowed to pay with CBDCs without 
additional charges, and the merchants, who should not bear additional costs for accepting this 
new instrument of payment.  
3.2 Central Bank Digital Currency (CBDC) and Cryptocurrency (CBCC) 
Before trying to provide an exhaustive definition for central bank digital currency (CBDC) 
and central bank cryptocurrency (CBCC), it is important to pinpoint how it is spreading out 
the tendency of make these terms synonymous. This is not correct since “cryptocurrency” 
concerns those currencies based on crypto-technology (as distributed ledger technology), 
while “digital currency” consists in the superset, which includes cryptocurrencies as well as 
other types of digital exchanges based on other technologies
57
. 
In the following I present both definitions but, despite the differences, I will use the broad 
term of CBDC to present the possible future developments in section 3.3. 
3.2.1 Design Features 
A commonly agreed definition for the term “central bank digital currency” (CBDC) has 
not been reached yet since it embraces a broad range of different designs and policy choices. 
In fact, it gathers together many topics as computer science, banking, payments systems, 
monetary policy, financial stability and cryptography. 
Meaning et al. (2018)
58
 provide a general definition by identify central bank digital 
currency as “an electronic, fiat liability, of a central bank that can be used to settle payments 
or as a store of value”. 
Within this wide description, many sub-characteristics and parameters could be identified 
based on particular features, such as: access, interest, trade, underlying technology, 
availability, anonymity and limits or caps. 
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 Access 
CBDCs can be either universally accessible, meaning that everyone can held this type of 
currency to pursue any object, or restrictively accessible by allowing only some individuals or 
economic agents to adopt it for finite purposes. Bjerg (2017)
59
 distinguishes between “retail 
CBDC”, available only to households and non-financial business, and “wholesale CBDC” 
used by firms which are not allowed having access to central bank reserves
60
. 
 Interest 
A CBDC may or not bear an interest. An interest-bearing CBDC can pay positive, zero or 
negative interest in order to pursue different objectives. For examples it could stabilize 
inflation and output or regulate the demand of CBDCs. A non-interest-bearing CBDC is 
usually named “e-cash” since it is similar to central bank notes. 
 Trade 
Many researchers argue whether a CBDC might or not be trade at par with other central 
bank liabilities. Typically, different types of central bank liabilities are mutually exchanged 
1:1, which means that a unit of central bank notes can be exchange with one unit of reserves. 
Someone could argue that this convention must be modified, but according to Meaning et al. 
(2018) this would confuse the economic agents on whether currency is the proper unit of 
account in the economy. Moreover, prices of gods and services might be expressed with both 
values, leading to a raise in the administrative costs. 
 Underlying technology 
CBDCs could differ by the underlying technology adopted. They could be account-based 
or token-based currencies
61
. An account-based CBDC involves a transaction of a claim 
between accounts and the way in which this operation is carry out is similar to the one 
between commercial bank depositors, with the exception that accounts in this case are hold 
with the central bank. As shown in Figure 8, user A should log into his account at the central 
bank and request to transfer some fundus to user’s B account, which is also at the central 
bank. A central ledger is updating to ensure and verify the settlements. Each transaction is 
completed immediately after the payer’s account ownership, the funds availability and the 
payee’s account authenticity are checked. A token-based currency, on the contrary, entails a 
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transaction of a token between wallets, which requires an external verification on both the 
token and the settlement. As a consequence, this confirmation restricts the anonymity of the 
transaction in a way that depends on the features of the technology adopted. This verification 
can be based either on a centralized settlement or on a decentralized settlement through the 
use of a distributed ledger technology. 
Figure 8: Account-based or token-based currencies 
 
Source: Mancini-Griffoli, T., et al. (2018). 
 Availability 
CBDCs could potentially by designed to be available permanently 24 hours a day, 7 days a 
week. 
 Anonymity 
CBDCs, similarly to private cryptocurrencies, can ensure different degrees of anonymity. 
As I said in the first section, Bitcoin is a pseudo-anonymous currency since there are a private 
and a public key to confirm the identity of each network participant. CBDC’s anonymity 
feature can be calibrate in the development phase by the central bank and should be balanced 
taking into account the society’s needs, preferences and concerns relating to money 
laundering, privacy and financing of terrorism. 
 Limits or caps 
By imposing different limits or caps on both, the uses or the amount of holdings, central 
bank can control for potentially undesirable implications linked to CBDCs’ adoption. For 
example, a cap on the wholesale payments can make them less attractive than retail payments. 
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This approach, however, prevents a 1:1 convertibility of CBDC and it is linked to the trade 
characteristic already mentioned
62
. 
The feature that generates the greater uncertainty is whether or not the CBDC is a 
cryptocurrency. This new form of money could be both based on a cryptographic technique 
(CBCC)
63
 or on a more established and mature technology. The latter case it is not a 
cryptocurrency but it is still a form of central bank digital currency. 
Different combinations of the parameters just presented could design various CBDC 
schemes, which vary by their underlying aim. In section 3.3 I will present four possible 
settings. 
3.2.2 Taxonomy of Money 
Bech and Garratt (2017) provide a taxonomy of money rearranging the contents of two 
different papers, one published by the Committee on Payments and Market Infrastructures 
(2015), and the other written by Bjerg (2017). 
The first one tries to define a new class of cryptocurrencies arose through the event of 
Bitcoin and other altcoins. The report pinpoints three key features of this new form of money: 
cryptocurrencies are, indeed, electronic; are not the liability of anyone; and have the feature to 
be peer-to-peer exchangeable. Some of these characteristics belong also to other forms of 
money (Figure 9, left side). Cash, for example, has the peculiarity to be only a peer-to-peer 
form of money, while commercial bank deposits consist in a liability for the bank that issues 
them and are currently transferred between banks or central banks in an electronic form. 
Commodity monies, like gold coins, are exchanged in a peer-to-peer way but they do not have 
neither the liability not the electronic feature. 
This classification proposed by the Committee on Payments and Market Infrastructures 
(2015) has the flaw to neglect the characteristic of money accessibility, which is, however, 
included by Bjerg’s (2017) categorization.  The author, whose aim is to provide a definition of 
central bank digital currency, considers again three factors: universal accessibility, electronic 
and central bank-issued features (Figure 9, right side). 
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Figure 9: Two taxonomies of new forms of currency 
 
Source: Bech, M., Garratt, R., (2017).  
By merging together these two classifications, Bech and Garratt (2017) propose a new 
taxonomy of money, which relies on four fundamental characteristics: issuer (bank or other); 
form (electronic or physical); accessibility (universal or limited) and transfer mechanism 
(centralized or decentralized, i.e. peer-to-peer). In accordance to this classification, central 
bank cryptocurrencies (CBCCs) are defined as “an electronic form of central bank money that 
can be exchanged in a decentralized manner known as peer-to-peer, meaning that 
transactions occur directly between the payer and the payee without the need for a central 
intermediary”64. The absence of an intermediary is the key features of this new form of 
money that discern it from other existing forms of central bank exchanges.  Furthermore, the 
authors incorporate Bjerg’s distinction between retail and wholesale CBDC and conceive the 
terms “retail CBCC” and “wholesale CBCC”. 
These two forms of CBCCs offer some advantages compared to the classical forms of 
central bank money. For the consumer-facing kind, indeed, a peer-to-peer element can 
provide anonymity features similar to those of cash. On the wholesale side, this new form of 
digital settlement could improve efficiency by reducing the settlement costs. Even if some 
central banks have tested these wholesale CBCCs, only few have announced to be ready to 
use this technology
65
. 
  
                                                          
64
 Bech, M., Garratt, R., (2017). Central bank cryptocurrencies. 
65
 See section 3.4 Global Responses. 
47 
 
Figure 10 offers a graphical representation of the taxonomy through what is called “the 
money flower”. 
Figure 10: The money flower: a taxonomy of money 
 
Source: Bech, M., Garratt, R., (2017).  
The authors provide also some examples for each of these categories by specifying 
whether the mentioned projects are still in operation; a suggestion about a future adoption; in 
experimentation or they are abandoned plans
66
. 
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3.3 Possible Future Applications 
Cash as mean of payment fulfills four requirements: universality, anonymity, peer-to-peer 
exchangeability and unit of account. Before the appearance of the distributed ledger 
technology in 2008, preserving all these attributes in a digitalized form of cash was not an 
option.  DLT offers a smart way to preserve these features and provides a new way of 
thinking about money as central banks are now searching for new ways to implement CBDC 
schemes that conserve only some of the keys properties of physical cash
67
. 
Gouveia et al. (2017)
68
  present four possible development scenarios of CBDC, ordered 
from the less to the more disruptive (Figure 11): 
A. “CBDC for interbank settlement: a scheme that rejects universality and anonymity of 
cash; 
B. CBDC similar to cash: a scheme that retains all four key attributes of cash; 
C. CBDC as a new policy tool: a scheme that includes the possibility of bearing interest 
rates (even negative rates, thus eroding the historical zero-bound to financial 
repression); 
D. CBDC as a deposit in the CB: a scheme that rejects anonymity in favor of 
transparency.” 
Figure 11: Four possible development scenarios of CBDC 
 
Source: Gouveia, O., C., et al. (2017).  
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3.3.1 Scenario A: CBDC for interbank settlement 
In this scenario CBDCs are available only to a limited number of players: Tier1 banks, 
which are authorized to be engaged in settlement directly with central banks; and those 
smaller banks or non-bank institutions that handle high volume of transactions but are not 
allowed to contract with central banks. 
In this framework the distributed ledger technology is applied to the intra-bank payments 
mechanism but CBDCs would not be anonymous: the nodes and the wallets would be known. 
It competes with the current settlement system, where banks, to obtain financing, open 
settlement accounts with Tier1 banks, which are the only one eligible to negotiate with central 
banks. The top-tier banks not only play the role of intermediaries with other banks but also 
manage their own customers’ accounts. Moreover, by construction, the current settlement 
system has the disadvantage to be extremely costly since it requires a continuous control in 
order to avoid double spending which can lead to sudden default (Figure 12). 
Figure 12: Current Settlement System 
 
Source: Gouveia, O., C., et al. (2017).  
In the scenario with a CBDC-based settlement system, the distributed ledger technology 
would replace the centralized ledger and the CBDC wallets would substitute the settlement 
accounts. This framework would be less costly and would facilitate instant settlements since 
the central bank becomes another node in the network and each transaction could be validated 
by all players. Even the non-bank institutions or other players could participate to the 
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network, thus allowing direct setting transfers with the central bank and avoiding the 
intermediation of Tier1 banks (Figure 13). 
Figure 13: CBDC for Interbank Settlement 
 
Source: Gouveia, O., C., et al. (2017).  
This implementation of CBDC is the more probable since it could represent an 
intermediate step for testing how this new form of money can work. 
3.3.2 Scenario B: CBDC similar to cash 
CBDC in this framework has the same characteristic of cash: it is universality acceptable, 
anonymous, peer-to-peer exchangeable and consists in a unit of account. Banks remain money 
creators with reserves at the CB and CBDCs are exchanged at parity 1:1 with cash. 
Since the value of CBDC is pegged to that of cash, their performance would be equivalent, 
but this does not rule out their possibility to be subject to exchange rate instability. The usage 
of CBDCs would increase in those areas where people are familiar with online transactions, 
but it could not replace cash where people are less confident with technology or the internet 
connection is poor. 
In comparison with bank deposits, CBDCs would be riskier since their anonymity restricts 
the authorities’ ability to act as guarantors: since they are untraceable, once the password or 
the wallets are forgotten, none can help customers to recover them. 
Agents would probably be less prone to use CBDC for illicit purposes, since they could 
fear that their anonymity can be reveal by authorities at a certain point in time. 
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3.3.3 Scenario C: CBDC as new policy tool 
In this case, CBDCs are designed to be universality acceptable, anonymous and peer-to-
peer exchangeable and, most important, an interest-bearing currency. This last feature is 
possible through the technology on which the new form of currency is based: by changing the 
face value of the whole stock of CBDCs, they would hold an interest. The new flexibility 
acquired by the currency allows authorities to apply positive (equivalent to a raise in CBDC’s 
face value) or even negative (equivalent to a reduction of CBDC’s face value) interest rates. 
The first case permits an automatic expansion of the monetary base, while the second 
disentangles monetary policy to the zero-lower bound limit and gives the chance to quickly 
react to recession threats. 
The new flexibility acquired does not always match with political-social desirability. The 
new ability of CB to modify CBDC’s face value could be seen as an expropriation and raises 
legitimacy issues about its power to implement fiscal policies. Moreover, since CBDC would 
not be constant, its role of unit of account is called into question
69
. 
The new form of money can be compared to cash, bank deposits and other private/foreign 
currencies. A scenario where this kind of CBDC would coexist with cash is hard to imagine 
since if rates applied to the new currency are negative, people would switch them in favor of 
physical cash. On the other hand, if the applied rates are positive, people substitute cash with 
CBDCs. Scenario C seems, thus, possible to exist only if cash is abolished. 
Compare to bank deposits, CBDC has the advantage to be exchanged without 
intermediaries but it has the disadvantage to lack in its store of value function. For this reason 
bank deposits would continuous to attract those agents, who are looking for a form of money 
with this specific financial characteristic. The yield spread between these two options would 
determine their mutual demands. 
The demand of CBDC respect for other types of private/foreign currencies may depend 
mostly on the perceived stability of former compare to the latters. 
  3.3.4 Scenario D: CBDC as public deposit in central bank 
In this latter scenario, CBDC is universality acceptable, peer-to-peer exchangeable, not 
interest bearing and, most important, not anonymous. In addition to the fact that this kind of 
money is identified, CBDCs are also kept in a public deposit and these features make this 
design, for the end users’ point of view, the safer compared to the previous described 
scenarios but it is perceived as less desirable than cash for a minority of people, who concern 
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about the central authorities’ ability to monitor their transactions. This new form of money is 
also a better possibility to store personal savings compared to central bank deposits, since the 
risk of keeping them at the CB is lower than having a deposit in a commercial bank. Some 
agents, on the other hand, would in any case prefer to store their savings in bank deposits as 
they guarantee higher remuneration and services. CBs, in fact, would lack of incentives and 
skills to offer customers’ oriented financial services and thus they would not be involved in 
this business. 
Risk-loving clients, searching for higher returns and willing to bare higher risks, would 
turn to commercial banks, which start resembling their competitors: investment banks and 
mutual funds. 
 Compared to previous scenario, as already mentioned, CBDC will be a better store of 
value but its ability to be used as a medium of exchange depends on common belief about 
safety and anonymity and how society values them. 
Storing saving as CBDC deposits in CBs is for end users the same to keep deposits in a 
narrow-bank, “i.e. a financial institution that is compelled by authorities to maintain the 
public’s resources under custody in a liquid and safe form, such as in government bonds, 
rather than leveraging on them in order to create credit”70. It is highly probable that a 
narrow-banking system would emerge with the introduction of such CBDC scheme. 
3.3.5 Advantages and Disadvantages 
In this section I briefly sum up the main advantages and disadvantages for each scenario 
previously described. 
Table 10: Advantages and Disadvantages for each scenario 
ADVANTAGES DISADVANTAGES 
Scenario A: CBDC for interbank settlement 
 Lower costs to manage and control the 
system; 
 Full availability (24 hours a day, every 
day); 
 The decentralized system is more resilient 
to cyber-attacks since there are many 
points that need to be corrupted; 
 High initial cost of implementation; 
 Some players loose a source of revenue: 
- Tier1 banks lose privilege and part of 
their payment business; 
- banks’ revenues are reduced since 
non-bank institutions are allowed to 
compete in the market and thus their 
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 The systemic risk could be managed in a 
better way since the information about the 
capital flows are transparent and collected 
in real-time; 
 CBDCs compete with private digital 
currencies in order to keep control of the 
settlement system; 
 Competition in the business increases due 
to, both, the integration of non-bank 
fintechs into the financial system and the 
cost efficiency in the settlement process; 
 As competition increases, transaction fees 
are reduced and thus the costs associated 
with payments; 
 Since each player has access to the CB 
settlement system, competition among 
them shifts to offer additional services; 
 Banks maintain their competitive 
advantage on non-banks in the credit 
business; 
 End-customers benefit from cheaper and 
faster money transfer. 
market share increased; 
However, all things considered, banks’ 
benefits would exceed their costs and 
revenues losses. 
Scenario B: CBDC similar to cash 
 Users benefit from a digital representation 
of cash that, compare to current non-
government digital currencies (such as 
bitcoin): 
- is free of volatility, price instability, 
lack of liquidity that characterized 
private currencies (like bitcoin); 
- maintains some of their advantages, 
by allowing cheaper and faster money 
transections; 
 This framework: 
- promotes financial inclusion; 
 Threats of losing anonymity (due to 
policy decisions or hacking attempts); 
 The system undergoes continuous costs to 
be updated and maintain an adequate 
security level avoiding hacking attempts; 
 Users could overcome some “access 
barriers”, such suboptimal infrastructures 
and technological illiteracy; 
 Monetary authorities have to finance and 
implement a new infrastructure that 
demands new equipment and skills; 
 Banks’ payment system would end since 
54 
 
- allows CBs to compete with other 
digital currencies and thus limits 
monetary authorities’ lack of control; 
 Banking regulation might be simplified, 
because: 
- the sector would be less concentrated; 
- banking activity could turn out to be 
less prone to systemic disruption; 
 CBDCs facilitate new business 
opportunities for banks: they could, for 
example, be entailed to manage and 
protect the keys for wallets; 
 For both users and monetary authorities, 
benefits would overcome costs; 
the intermediation for payment 
transactions becomes redundant; 
 Banks might suffer for the substitution of 
bank deposits with CBDC, thus harming 
their credit formation ability; 
 Since the deposits’ volume decreases and 
their volatility raises (as there are more 
alternative to store value), asset and 
liability management would become more 
difficult for banks; 
 Costs would exceed benefits for banks; 
Scenario C: CBDC new policy tool 
 The framework: 
- allows the implementation of stronger 
and more flexible responses in case of 
recession; 
- eases a faster path to digitalization; 
 Banking regulation might be simplified, 
because: 
- the sector would be less concentrated; 
- banking activity could turn out to be 
less prone to systemic disruption; 
 CBDCs facilitate new business 
opportunities for banks: they could, for 
example, be entailed to manage and 
protect the wallets’ keys; 
 Threats of losing anonymity (due to 
policy decisions or hacking attempts); 
 The likely elimination of cash would raise 
the costs for end users derived from 
internal disruption of power shortage; 
 Authorities incur high costs in order to 
guarantee universal access to CBDC; 
 Possibility to apply negative rates raises 
questions about the authorities’ 
legitimacy to adopt these policy 
measures; 
 Since CBDC competes with bank 
deposits, the volatility of the latter may 
raise; 
Scenario D: CBDC as public deposit in central bank 
 Policy makers gain high surveillance 
powers with the ability to: 
- prevent illicit activities; 
- reduce tax evasion; 
 Reduction of the bank-related risk since a 
 Large surveillance power raises question 
about the state of legitimacy to control 
people’s transactions since CB monitor 
would diminish individuals’ decision 
room; 
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significant part of deposits would be kept 
in CB and thus are implicitly guaranteed; 
 Higher efficiency of the system; 
 This scenario allows: 
- CBs to compete with other digital 
currencies; 
- cheaper and faster money transfer; 
 Deposits reduction in commercial banks 
are larger: 
- the poorer is the coverage of deposit 
protection; 
- the lower is the remuneration of bank 
deposits; 
- the worst the services provided by 
banks; 
 It is a safer option to store users’ savings; 
 Users would benefit from the increasing 
competition among banks, central banks 
and fintechs; 
 A decreasing in banks’ deposits leads to a 
reduction of credit that is particularly 
harmful in emerging economies which 
have not yet benefited from a high 
bancarization level; 
 There would be large implementation 
costs for policy makers; 
 Banks’ funding would be less stable; 
 Increasing competition with fintechs, 
would harm banks’ profit; 
 Probably the overall costs of this scheme 
would exceed its benefits. 
Source: Author’s elaboration 
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3.4 Global Responses 
Many countries are looking at CBDCs with increasing interest and are trying to understand 
whether their applications will become reality in the near future. Following what Blakstad and 
Allen (2018)
71
 analyze, I present below a summary of the main implementation attempts. 
China, as first example, intends in the following years to issue its own CBDC, the 
blockchain-based digital Renminbi, becoming the first major country to promote this new 
form of money. Since Bitcoin has been released, the country has shown an attitude towards 
blockchain technology, investigating in its possible applications at national level. In January 
2017, China’s central bank tested a digital note exchange platform that allows commercial 
banks to exchange notes and in July of the same year, the Central Bank Digital Currency 
Research Institution initiated to operate separately from People’s Bank of China (PBOC). The 
Chinese CBDC will be probably firstly limited only to intra-banks operations with the goal to 
be adopted in the future by end users in daily digital transactions
72
. 
The United Kingdom has started in the early 2015 to explore the possibility to implement a 
sterling-linked digital currency based on blockchain technology but the Bank of England does 
not make any promises about the forthcoming development of a crypto-pound, despite it does 
not neglect this possibility. 
Singapore launched a project in 2016, called “Project Urbin” to explore the opportunities 
offered by this new technology, in particular clarifying the benefits and the implications for 
security payments. The aim was to implement efficient and simple-to-use alternatives 
payment system. The project consisted in two phases and the first one, related to the 
development of a prototype solution for domestic inter-bank payments, was successfully 
accomplished in March 2017. Later, in October 2017, the Monetary Authority of Singapore 
(MAS) declared also the second phase concluded and to have successfully implemented three 
different models for decentralized inter-bank payments. Finally, it announced the will to 
conduct spin-off projects, investigating new methods of cross-border payments using CBDCs. 
However, in January 2018, the managing director of the MAS, Ravi Menon, expressed some 
doubts about the applicability of CBDCs
73
. 
Canada is another country that has attempted to clarify the implication of blockchain 
applications by developing a wholesale CBDC, called CADcoin. It has been tested among 
different fintech firms and Canadian banks, but it has not been released yet. In November 
2017, the Bank of Canada listed the benefits and the risks of these new applications in a paper 
                                                          
71
 Blakstad, S., Allen, R., (2018). FinTech Revolution: Universal Inclusion in the New Financial Ecosystem. 
72
 Wan, D., (2019). Digital Renminbi: A Fiat Coin to make M0 Great Again. Coindesk. 
73
 O’Neal, S., (2018). State-Issued Digital Currencies: The Countries Which Adopted, Rejected or Researched 
the Concept. Cointelegraph. 
57 
 
titled “Central Bank Digital Currency: Motivations and Implications”, and it reached the 
conclusion that central banks should move gradually since CBDCs are still a complex and 
uncertain topic. 
Dubai affirmed in September 2017 the intention to launch its own digital currency called 
“emCash”. This currency, available by smartphones, is planned to satisfy Dubai’s citizens’ 
needs by ensuring faster processing and delivery time, while reducing complexity and costs. 
However, since a specific release date was not announced, probably the project is on its early 
stages. 
Sweden is also leading a project to become a completely cashless country. The Risksbank 
of Sweden has implemented an eKorona project, whose results are expected to be published in 
late 2019, with the object to develop a system enabling CBDCs to be supplied to the general 
public. An estimated launch date has not been announced yet, since the authority wants to be 
careful and verified all the technological implications before made it available to the general 
public
74
. 
Russia has a CryptoRouble project under way, which in addition to be “traceable 
encryption”75 will probably have the features to be centrally controlled, taxed and regulated. 
Apparently, Putin and the government see these new CBDCs as a way to circumvent wester 
sanctions. Moreover, after issuing CryptoRouble they are supposed to be overtaken also by 
other countries members of the Eurasian Economic Community. The Russian 
Communications Ministry hypothesized that a 13% tax rate will be charged if this new form 
of money is converted back to Roubles, implying that the digital currency can be exchange 
also outside its monitored area. 
Ecuador, even its small dimension, was one of the first countries to create its digital 
currency in 2014, called “the Sistema de Dinero Electrónico”. The reasons behind its 
introduction were to support the Ecuadorian dollar-based monetary system
76
 and reduce both 
the poverty level and the expanses for changing deteriorating old notes. In 2015, the currency, 
stored in digital wallets, became to be accepted as payment for public transport, invoicing 
system and country’s tax but it was not so common among consumers’ payments or widely 
accepted by country’s banks. Despite the ban of Bitcoin and other cryptocurrencies to ease the 
diffusion of the new digital money, the CBDC failed. On 26 March 2018 the system was 
completely deactivated, and all the accounts were closed. The reasons seem to be the inability 
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of the new money to attract users, combined with their lack of trust in the local central banks 
and institutions. People were thus reluctant to accept other currencies rather than US dollars. 
Japan in 2017 entrusted a Fintech department with the task to offer guidance to banks 
seeking new business opportunities. Furthermore, the Bank of Japan participated with the 
European Central Bank to a research project on distributed ledger technologies and in 
September 2017 they agreed that the blockchain was not evolved enough to be applied in the 
payment system. Despite this conclusion, the Bank of Japan is planning to release a digital 
currency during the Olympics in 2020, named “JCoin”. This new form of money will allow 
payments via smartphones using QR codes and will be convertible at pair with yen. 
Estonia announced in December 2017 that it was working on three different models of a 
new digital currency, the “Estcoin”. The initiative was strongly criticized by the European 
Central Bank since a member state cannot introduce and adopt its own currency. Despite the 
manager director of Estonia’s e-residency programme, Kaspar Korjus, replied that Estcoin 
would not enter into competition with euro
77
, the program was shut down and only the other 
two approaches have been carried out: the “community Estcoin” to reward who voluntarily 
helps in the enhancing of the system, and the “identity Estcoin” related to the recognition of 
persons’ digital identities. 
Senegal introduced in the market its digital currency based on the blockchain technology, 
the eCFA. This new form of money was created through a collaboration program between the 
local bank Banque Régionale de Marchés (BRM) and eCurrency Mint Limited (an Ireland-
based startup), and has the properties to be pegged to the country’s currency, the CFA franc, 
be stored in e-wallets and be compatible with other digital currencies of the African area. 
BRM and eCurrency Mint claimed, indeed, in a joint statement that “The eCFA is a high-
security digital instrument that can be held in all mobile money and e-money wallets. It will 
secure universal liquidity, enable interoperability and provide transparency to the entire 
digital ecosystem in West African Economic and Monetary Union”78. 
Venezuela with his President Nicolas Maduro announced in November 2017 that the 
collapsed economic situation would be rescued by the introduction of a digital currency, the 
Petro or Pedromoneda, backed by country’s oil, gold and mineral reserves. The goals of this 
launching were to gain control of the monetary sovereignty, ease financial transaction and 
overcome the financial “blockade”, sanctions erected by the US president Donald Trump’s 
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administration that impacted negatively on the local economy
79
. On 20 February 2018, the 
Pedro was launched as the first digital currency adopted by a state but so far it does not 
achieve the desired results
80
. 
Although it seems that also the authorities of India, Iran and Bangladesh are working on 
the releases of their own national cryptocurrencies, the US Federal Reserves is not looking 
forward to implement a crypto-backed Dollar because the common belief is that “the key 
characteristic of cryptocurrencies are a red flag for central banks”81. 
Switzerland shares the same idea since, in June 2018, Thomas Moser, the board direction 
of the Swiss National Bank (SNK), declared that both the blockchain technology and the 
cryptocurrencies are not established enough to be applied in the creation of CBDCs. 
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Conclusion 
The findings of my analysis show how, in the considered time frame, the Bitcoin historical 
price is not connected with the price derived from the model, and vice versa. 
This result is different from the one obtained by Hayes and Abbatemarco et al. (2018), 
who conclude that the Bitcoin price could be explained by the cost of production model. 
The reason behind these opposite outcomes could be the considered time window. In fact, 
the present analysis includes also those months where Bitcoin price sours up, reaching a peak 
of 19.270$ on the 19
th
 December 2017, without following a stable path. This has a relevant 
impact on my results even if the historical price started declining in 2018, converging again to 
the model one. 
Looking at the overall time frame, it seems that the increasing value of the historical price 
from the beginning of 2017 to the end of 2018 is a unique episode that required some months 
to solve. 
Taking into accounts all these considerations, it is now possible to find a response to the 
research question: “Could Bitcoin be seen as a virtual commodity?”. The answer is: no, or 
better not only. As Abbatemarco et al. (2018) highlight, this approach does not rule out the 
possibility of a bubble development and, given the actual time frame, this is the reason why it 
would be more precise to explain Bitcoin price not only with the one implied by the model, 
but also with other explanatory variables that the literature seems to identify as meaningful. 
Therefore, to avoid misleading results, Bitcoin intrinsic characteristics must thus be 
considered and checked by adding to the profit and cost functions also these suggested 
parameters that range from technical aspects and Internet components to financial indexes, 
commodity prices and exchange rate. 
This could open new horizons for research, which, despite the traditional drivers, should 
consider also new factors such as Google Trends, Wikipedia queries and Tweets. These 
elements are related to the Internet component and appear to be particularly relevant given the 
social and digital Bitcoin’s nature. 
Moreover, Kristoufek’s (2013) intuition, which considers Bitcoin as an unique asset that 
presents properties of both a speculative financial asset and a standard one, whose price 
drivers will change over time considering its dynamic nature and volatility, seems to be 
confirmed. 
For sure, the cryptocurrencies introduction, with their distributed ledger technology, had a 
massive impact in the economy, leading financial institutions to foresee new way of carrying 
out the economic system. It seems actually possible that an increasing number of central 
banks would issue their own digital currencies in the years ahead and, moreover, among the 
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four possible presented scenarios, it appears reasonable what Gouveia et al. (2017) suggest: 
Central Bank Digital Currency (CBDC) must firstly be adopted for interbank settlement. This 
scenario has, in fact, the advantage to consist as an intermediate step for testing how this new 
form of money can work. 
It is important to point out that the success of a CBDC adoption depends, not only on 
technical issues, but also on individual preferences, social behavior and beliefs. This increases 
the complexity of their nature, which required further analysis and prudence. 
As shown in paragraph 3.4, some countries already tried to adopt various forms of CBDC, 
but the results are uncertain, since a deep understanding of the topic is required to achieve a 
suitable implementation. Most central banks are therefore proceeding with caution, trying to 
find a proper way to balance associated risks and profits. 
In conclusion, private and public digital currencies consist in a challenging field of study, 
whose inherent potential has not been fully understood yet, but probably has the ability to 
reshape the economic and the financial system in the future.  
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Appendix 
Table A.1: Weights Distribution 
 
Source: Author’s elaboration 
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Table A.2: Biannual Efficiency 
 
Source: Author’s elaboration 
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Table A.3: Weighted Devices’ Price (Average Prices) 
 
Source: Author’s elaboration 
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Table A.4: Weighted Lifespans 
 
Source: Author’s elaboration 
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Table A.5: Biannual Electricity Cost 
Semester Year Wwest West CEwest CEest biannualCE($/kWh) 
2 2010 0,7 0,3 12,25 1,2 0,1345 
1 2011 0,66875 0,33125 11,70313 1,325 0,13028125 
2 2011 0,6375 0,3625 11,15625 1,45 0,1260625 
1 2012 0,60625 0,39375 10,60938 1,575 0,12184375 
2 2012 0,575 0,425 10,0625 1,7 0,117625 
1 2013 0,54375 0,45625 9,515625 1,825 0,11340625 
2 2013 0,5125 0,4875 8,96875 1,95 0,1091875 
1 2014 0,48125 0,51875 8,421875 2,075 0,10496875 
2 2014 0,45 0,55 7,875 2,2 0,10075 
1 2015 0,41875 0,58125 7,328125 2,325 0,09653125 
2 2015 0,3875 0,6125 6,78125 2,45 0,0923125 
1 2016 0,35625 0,64375 6,234375 2,575 0,08809375 
2 2016 0,325 0,675 5,6875 2,7 0,083875 
1 2017 0,29375 0,70625 5,140625 2,825 0,07965625 
2 2017 0,2625 0,7375 4,59375 2,95 0,0754375 
1 2018 0,23125 0,76875 4,046875 3,075 0,07121875 
2 2018 0,2 0,8 3,5 3,2 0,067 
       
Source: Author’s elaboration 
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Table A.6: Deltas 
 
Source: Author’s elaboration 
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Table A.7: Block Time and Fees 
DateTime Hashrate Difficulty BT (s) 
TOT 
Transaction 
Fees 
Daily 
Transaction 
Fees 
(BTC) 
31/07/2010 2.464.398.497,64 244,213 425,6158 0,3 323 0,0009288 
31/08/2010 5.701.927.397,06 623,387 469,5652 0,35 324 0,0010802 
30/09/2010 9.570.510.422,87 1318,67 591,7808 0,0 976 0,0000000 
31/10/2010 27.510.703.301,01 3091,737 482,6816 0,0 426 0,0000000 
30/11/2010 68.953.790.963,51 6866,899 427,7228 0,03 456 6,58E-05 
31/12/2010 116.641.878.937,44 14484,162 533,3333 0,0806039 565 0,0001427 
31/01/2011 186.021.037.099,02 22012,381 508,2353 2,8210879 2.768 0,0010192 
28/02/2011 414.505.489.254,17 55589,518 576 1,09 2.302 0,0004735 
31/03/2011 689.209.762.451,73 68977,785 429,8507 4,0509 1.693 0,0023927 
30/04/2011 1.030.377.325.650,24 109670,13 457,1429 7,7478269 3.632 0,0021332 
31/05/2011 3.242.678.281.859,52 434877,05 576 18,242688 5.303 0,0034401 
30/06/2011 13.094.963.916.948,80 1379192,3 452,356 20,008027 9.937 0,0020135 
31/07/2011 14.709.605.099.479,30 1690895,8 493,7143 5,4575083 6.100 0,0008947 
31/08/2011 13.697.915.570.338,70 1777774,5 557,4194 9,8799633 7.683 0,001286 
30/09/2011 10.245.226.789.593,50 1689334,4 708,1967 3,3034121 5.388 0,0006131 
31/10/2011 7.836.998.604.789,39 1203461,9 659,542 3,0873172 4.738 0,0006516 
30/11/2011 8.783.602.827.814,50 1090715,7 533,3333 5,0343659 6.550 0,0007686 
31/12/2011 8.706.721.615.131,83 1159929,5 572,1854 3,2551359 5.034 0,0006466 
31/01/2012 9.751.129.414.143,54 1307728,4 576 28,379139 6.053 0,0046884 
29/02/2012 12.246.527.873.312,90 1376302,3 482,6816 3,4994847 6.633 0,0005276 
31/03/2012 13.745.590.058.278,80 1626553,5 508,2353 4,2526487 6.786 0,0006267 
30/04/2012 13.423.639.484.651,40 1508589,7 482,6816 3,9405077 7.840 0,0005026 
31/05/2012 10.914.801.619.952,20 1591075 626,087 19,028216 25.517 0,0007457 
30/06/2012 11.329.307.771.943,70 1726566,6 654,5455 11,976852 23.222 0,0005158 
31/07/2012 13.161.650.967.537,90 2036671,1 664,6154 20,1915 34.444 0,0005862 
31/08/2012 16.985.500.288.894,50 2440642,6 617,1429 29,398627 34.045 0,0008635 
30/09/2012 22.637.974.308.662,00 2864140,5 543,3962 13,885991 22.483 0,0006176 
31/10/2012 23.653.504.403.772,50 3304356,4 600 23,812173 31.096 0,0007658 
30/11/2012 21.368.636.454.168,60 3438909 691,2 28,942177 36.545 0,000792 
31/12/2012 23.402.729.261.443,20 2979636,6 546,8354 33,267007 43.029 0,0007731 
31/01/2013 28.482.674.089.138,00 2968775,3 447,6684 34,459397 41.090 0,0008386 
28/02/2013 30.490.785.796.451,20 3651011,6 514,2857 57,564022 61.163 0,0009412 
31/03/2013 56.251.874.756.664,30 6695826,3 511,2426 65,680689 60.832 0,0010797 
30/04/2013 74.633.390.176.076,10 10076293 579,8658 45,746519 52.096 0,0008781 
31/05/2013 105.726.140.279.199,00 12153412 493,7143 47,145952 56.516 0,0008342 
30/06/2013 162.269.499.322.755,00 21335329 564,7059 24,446447 36.217 0,000675 
31/07/2013 295.220.469.662.408,00 31256961 454,7368 38,709962 43.808 0,0008836 
31/08/2013 728.865.067.652.167,00 65750060 387,4439 43,046084 61.944 0,0006949 
30/09/2013 1.205.848.335.384.680,00 148819200 530,0613 25,451135 40.430 0,0006295 
31/10/2013 4.100.400.017.728.000,00 390928788 409,4787 30,082821 49.095 0,0006127 
30/11/2013 6.189.120.342.010.940,00 707408283 490,9091 25,947939 89.811 0,0002889 
31/12/2013 10.801.537.922.461.200,00 1,181E+09 469,5652 11,692365 55.125 0,0002121 
31/01/2014 20.066.445.524.103.800,00 2,194E+09 469,5652 13,333394 61.116 0,0002182 
28/02/2014 28.158.518.665.937.100,00 3,13E+09 477,3481 14,685962 72.528 0,0002025 
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31/03/2014 44.800.630.179.722.400,00 5,007E+09 480 10,599807 54.971 0,0001928 
30/04/2014 54.488.395.027.708.900,00 8,001E+09 630,6569 12,514559 64.708 0,0001934 
31/05/2014 76.404.230.086.637.500,00 1,046E+10 587,7551 11,798537 65.979 0,0001788 
30/06/2014 110.358.632.936.101.000,00 1,682E+10 654,5455 8,9302009 50.331 0,0001774 
31/07/2014 143.434.608.511.561.000,00 1,874E+10 561,039 10,744746 65.667 0,0001636 
31/08/2014 222.841.095.649.388.000,00 2,384E+10 459,5745 9,1553722 61.386 0,0001491 
30/09/2014 263.623.410.749.534.000,00 3,466E+10 564,7059 12,353139 79.295 0,0001558 
31/10/2014 336.304.905.509.895.000,00 3,599E+10 459,5745 13,717535 91.785 0,0001495 
30/11/2014 320.532.059.789.074.000,00 4,03E+10 540 11,206979 80.187 0,0001398 
31/12/2014 307.081.470.445.705.000,00 4,064E+10 568,4211 12,529827 83.173 0,0001506 
31/01/2015 340.579.824.489.384.000,00 4,127E+10 520,4819 10,997977 79.874 0,0001377 
28/02/2015 329.538.396.656.713.000,00 4,668E+10 608,4507 14,651859 103.737 0,0001412 
31/03/2015 348.351.298.391.091.000,00 4,672E+10 576 15,038765 104.273 0,0001442 
30/04/2015 317.142.355.890.591.000,00 4,761E+10 644,7761 16,907277 117.681 0,0001437 
31/05/2015 359.082.535.929.914.000,00 4,881E+10 583,7838 16,07206 122.358 0,0001314 
30/06/2015 356.089.184.959.351.000,00 4,94E+10 595,8621 18,812457 124.919 0,0001506 
31/07/2015 392.414.063.077.807.000,00 5,228E+10 572,1854 34,198081 124.672 0,0002743 
31/08/2015 423.446.540.478.744.000,00 5,426E+10 550,3185 19,542684 96.926 0,0002016 
30/09/2015 436.537.293.643.837.000,00 5,934E+10 583,7838 27,498236 141.393 0,0001945 
31/10/2015 454.915.351.205.089.000,00 6,225E+10 587,7551 31,187957 163.874 0,0001903 
30/11/2015 585.641.183.501.102.000,00 7,272E+10 533,3333 22,430798 130.631 0,0001717 
31/12/2015 733.276.604.663.887.000,00 1,04E+11 608,4507 31,016518 177.568 0,0001747 
31/01/2016 1.080.007.040.825.580.000,00 1,20E+11 477,3481 39,032167 195.293 0,0001999 
29/02/2016 1.080.919.494.946.580.000,00 1,63E+11 649,6241 45,836465 239.889 0,0001911 
31/03/2016 1.020.134.644.775.590.000,00 1,65E+11 696,7742 45,017414 198.641 0,0002266 
30/04/2016 1.296.655.181.852.460.000,00 1,79E+11 591,7808 49,381213 258.674 0,0001909 
31/05/2016 1.258.297.790.411.960.000,00 1,99E+11 680,315 56,152944 206.139 0,0002724 
30/06/2016 1.561.795.948.283.090.000,00 2,09E+11 576 61,677799 225.270 0,0002738 
31/07/2016 1.634.366.548.269.600.000,00 2,13E+11 561,039 66,493384 199.563 0,0003332 
31/08/2016 1.470.493.987.208.500.000,00 2,21E+11 644,7761 66,729189 248.782 0,0002682 
30/09/2016 1.702.788.621.491.550.000,00 2,41E+11 608,4507 67,666403 241.285 0,0002804 
31/10/2016 1.853.292.419.260.720.000,00 2,54E+11 587,7551 61,661948 205.888 0,0002995 
30/11/2016 1.989.192.739.728.200.000,00 2,82E+11 608,4507 101,056 289.509 0,0003491 
31/12/2016 2.337.271.653.891.100.000,00 3,18E+11 583,7838 99,824641 285.649 0,0003495 
31/01/2017 2.832.474.910.223.240.000,00 3,93E+11 595,8621 138,07004 252.964 0,0005458 
28/02/2017 3.352.427.031.868.180.000,00 4,41E+11 564,7059 198,13844 283.344 0,0006993 
31/03/2017 3.352.999.966.358.030.000,00 5,00E+11 640 206,53209 286.240 0,0007215 
30/04/2017 3.918.071.610.127.890.000,00 5,22E+11 572,1854 254,1149 342.452 0,000742 
31/05/2017 4.858.244.024.949.570.000,00 5,96E+11 526,8293 589,40149 348.282 0,0016923 
30/06/2017 5.448.313.580.843.890.000,00 7,12E+11 561,039 345,33975 232.242 0,001487 
31/07/2017 6.200.470.684.210.650.000,00 8,60E+11 595,8621 144,59399 194.083 0,000745 
31/08/2017 7.196.655.779.676.010.000,00 8,88E+11 530,0613 391,62567 275.899 0,0014195 
30/09/2017 7.569.349.388.439.090.000,00 1,10E+12 626,087 115,05341 256.088 0,0004493 
31/10/2017 9.966.505.886.699.330.000,00 1,45E+12 626,087 258,96021 316.229 0,0008189 
30/11/2017 11.182.287.318.862.000.000,00 1,35E+12 517,3653 290,66332 399.046 0,0007284 
31/12/2017 15.177.350.249.534.300.000,00 1,87E+12 530,0613 764,87176 338.192 0,0022616 
31/01/2018 15.139.761.911.894.200.000,00 2,60E+12 738,4615 162,67806 239.721 0,0006786 
28/02/2018 23.172.168.746.403.100.000,00 3,01E+12 557,4194 49,929181 215.529 0,0002317 
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31/03/2018 22.031.861.231.379.800.000,00 3,46E+12 675 25,665438 184.109 0,0001394 
30/04/2018 30.990.335.301.692.100.000,00 4,02E+12 557,4194 35,451689 183.970 0,0001927 
31/05/2018 36.396.936.182.652.700.000,00 4,31E+12 508,2353 22,629538 205.065 0,0001104 
30/06/2018 35.588.942.295.590.800.000,00 5,08E+12 612,766 26,962117 194.781 0,0001384 
31/07/2018 43.474.975.975.433.800.000,00 5,95E+12 587,7551 24,510049 231.194 0,000106 
31/08/2018 51.833.889.753.678.900.000,00 6,73E+12 557,4194 23,998609 233.840 0,0001026 
30/09/2018 57.956.171.195.079.300.000,00 7,15E+12 530,0613 19,399876 222.999 8,70E-05 
31/10/2018 58.201.028.613.416.300.000,00 7,18E+12 530,0613 19,021598 287.918 6,61E-05 
30/11/2018 33.404.486.801.782.100.000,00 6,65E+12 855,4455 44,471941 245.476 0,0001812 
31/12/2018 39.345.457.366.303.000.000,00 5,11E+12 557,4194 13,277209 259.993 5,11E-05 
Source: Author’s elaboration 
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Table A.8: Model Price and Historical Price 
Date Time Historical Hashrate (H/s) EFF (J/hash) CE ($/kWh) MAN ($) BR (BTC) BTs Fees (BTC) COST PROFIT 
Model Historical 
Price Price 
31/07/2010 2.464.398.497,64 6,59E-07 0,13381216 0,06278 50 425,6158 0,00092879 5,28 10.150,00 0 0,06 
31/08/2010 5.701.927.397,06 6,57E-07 0,13310139 0,06367 50 469,5652 0,00108025 12,02 9.200,00 0 0,06 
30/09/2010 9.570.510.422,87 6,54E-07 0,13241355 0,06453 50 591,7808 0,00000000 19,95 7.300,00 0 0,06 
31/10/2010 27.510.703.301,01 6,51E-07 0,13170279 0,06542 50 482,6816 0,00000000 56,66 8.950,00 0,01 0,19 
30/11/2010 68.953.790.963,51 6,48E-07 0,13101495 0,06628 50 427,7228 6,58E-05 140,55 10.100,00 0,01 0,21 
31/12/2010 116.641.878.937,44 6,45E-07 0,13030418 0,06717 50 533,3333 0,00014266 235,36 8.100,00 0,03 0,29 
31/01/2011 186.021.037.099,02 6,27E-07 0,12958201 0,07112 50 508,2353 0,00101918 363,08 8.500,00 0,04 0,51 
28/02/2011 414.505.489.254,17 6,11E-07 0,12892939 0,07477 50 576 0,0004735 783,96 7.500,00 0,1 0,88 
31/03/2011 689.209.762.451,73 5,93E-07 0,12820684 0,07882 50 429,8507 0,00239274 1.257,87 10.050,00 0,13 0,79 
30/04/2011 1.030.377.325.650,24 5,76E-07 0,1275076 0,08274 50 457,1429 0,00213321 1.815,14 9.450,00 0,19 3,29 
31/05/2011 3.242.678.281.859,52 5,58E-07 0,12678505 0,08679 50 576 0,00344007 5.501,68 7.500,00 0,73 8,88 
30/06/2011 13.094.963.916.948,80 5,40E-07 0,12608581 0,0907 50 452,356 0,00201349 21.402,26 9.550,00 2,24 16,51 
31/07/2011 14.709.605.099.479,30 5,16E-07 0,12537466 0,09664 50 493,7143 0,00089467 22.856,91 8.750,00 2,61 13,52 
31/08/2011 13.697.915.570.338,70 4,93E-07 0,12466389 0,10264 50 557,4194 0,00128595 20.185,48 7.750,00 2,6 8,35 
30/09/2011 10.245.226.789.593,50 4,69E-07 0,12397605 0,10844 50 708,1967 0,00061311 14.309,76 6.100,00 2,35 5,01 
31/10/2011 7.836.998.604.789,39 4,46E-07 0,12326529 0,11444 50 659,542 0,00065161 10.329,72 6.550,00 1,58 3,19 
30/11/2011 8.783.602.827.814,50 4,22E-07 0,12257745 0,12025 50 533,3333 0,00076861 10.915,61 8.100,00 1,35 2,91 
31/12/2011 8.706.721.615.131,83 3,99E-07 0,12186668 0,12625 50 572,1854 0,00064663 10.149,19 7.550,00 1,34 4,6 
31/01/2012 9.751.129.414.143,54 3,75E-07 0,12114835 0,1362 50 576 0,00468844 10.626,66 7.500,00 1,42 5,53 
29/02/2012 12.246.527.873.312,90 3,53E-07 0,12047613 0,14563 50 482,6816 0,00052759 12.485,93 8.950,00 1,4 4,82 
31/03/2012 13.745.590.058.278,80 3,29E-07 0,11975756 0,1557 50 508,2353 0,00062668 12.993,16 8.500,00 1,53 4,88 
30/04/2012 13.423.639.484.651,40 3,06E-07 0,11906216 0,16546 50 482,6816 0,00050262 11.734,25 8.950,00 1,31 4,94 
31/05/2012 10.914.801.619.952,20 2,82E-07 0,11834358 0,17554 50 626,087 0,00074571 8.747,93 6.900,00 1,27 5,15 
30/06/2012 11.329.307.771.943,70 2,59E-07 0,11764818 0,18529 50 654,5455 0,00051576 8.292,15 6.600,00 1,26 6,64 
31/07/2012 13.161.650.967.537,90 2,36E-07 0,11693716 0,21011 50 664,6154 0,00058621 8.726,62 6.500,00 1,34 9,24 
31/08/2012 16.985.500.288.894,50 2,13E-07 0,11622639 0,23541 50 617,1429 0,00086352 10.106,41 7.000,00 1,44 10,19 
30/09/2012 22.637.974.308.662,00 1,91E-07 0,11553855 0,2599 50 543,3962 0,00061762 11.996,08 7.950,00 1,51 12,35 
31/10/2012 23.653.504.403.772,50 1,68E-07 0,11482779 0,2852 50 600 0,00076576 10.961,53 7.200,00 1,52 10,99 
30/11/2012 21.368.636.454.168,60 1,46E-07 0,11413995 0,30969 25 691,2 0,00079196 8.543,69 3.125,00 2,73 12,51 
31/12/2012 23.402.729.261.443,20 1,23E-07 0,11342918 0,33499 25 546,8354 0,00077313 7.836,98 3.950,00 1,98 13,44 
31/01/2013 28.482.674.089.138,00 1,10E-07 0,11270701 0,37345 25 447,6684 0,00083863 8.457,79 4.825,00 1,75 20,53 
28/02/2013 30.490.785.796.451,20 9,81E-08 0,11205439 0,40857 25 514,2857 0,00094116 8.045,52 4.200,00 1,92 32,67 
31/03/2013 56.251.874.756.664,30 8,52E-08 0,11133184 0,44747 25 511,2426 0,00107971 12.806,64 4.225,00 3,03 92,59 
30/04/2013 74.633.390.176.076,10 7,27E-08 0,1106326 0,48511 25 579,8658 0,00087812 14.408,91 3.725,00 3,87 138,98 
31/05/2013 105.726.140.279.199,00 5,98E-08 0,10991005 0,524 25 493,7143 0,00083421 16.677,88 4.375,00 3,81 127,95 
30/06/2013 162.269.499.322.755,00 4,73E-08 0,10921081 0,56164 25 564,7059 0,000675 20.120,62 3.825,00 5,26 94,26 
31/07/2013 295.220.469.662.408,00 4,12E-08 0,10849966 0,62774 25 454,7368 0,00088363 31.703,67 4.750,00 6,67 104,48 
31/08/2013 728.865.067.652.167,00 3,54E-08 0,10778889 0,69474 25 387,4439 0,00069492 66.751,11 5.575,00 11,97 136,3 
30/09/2013 1.205.848.335.384.680,00 2,98E-08 0,10710105 0,75959 25 530,0613 0,00062951 92.217,33 4.075,00 22,63 133,44 
31/10/2013 4.100.400.017.728.000,00 2,39E-08 0,10639029 0,82659 25 409,4787 0,00061275 250.371,13 5.275,00 47,46 205,74 
30/11/2013 6.189.120.342.010.940,00 1,83E-08 0,10570245 0,89144 25 490,9091 0,00028892 286.757,64 4.400,00 65,17 1.103,89 
31/12/2013 10.801.537.922.461.200,00 1,24E-08 0,10499168 0,95844 25 469,5652 0,00021211 338.195,63 4.600,00 73,52 749,09 
31/01/2014 20.066.445.524.103.800,00 1,09E-08 0,10426951 1,096 25 469,5652 0,00021817 549.224,69 4.600,00 119,4 827,63 
28/02/2014 28.158.518.665.937.100,00 9,72E-09 0,10361689 1,22236 25 477,3481 0,00020249 680.925,85 4.525,00 150,48 552,85 
31/03/2014 44.800.630.179.722.400,00 8,38E-09 0,10289434 1,36227 25 480 0,00019283 927.201,32 4.500,00 206,04 458,66 
30/04/2014 54.488.395.027.708.900,00 7,08E-09 0,1021951 1,49766 25 630,6569 0,0001934 946.314,38 3.425,00 276,3 445,96 
31/05/2014 76.404.230.086.637.500,00 5,74E-09 0,10147255 1,63757 25 587,7551 0,00017882 1.067.613,98 3.675,00 290,51 616,81 
30/06/2014 110.358.632.936.101.000,00 4,44E-09 0,10077331 1,77296 25 654,5455 0,00017743 1.184.483,61 3.300,00 358,93 621,19 
31/07/2014 143.434.608.511.561.000,00 4,02E-09 0,10006216 1,8382 25 561,039 0,00016363 1.385.002,64 3.850,00 359,74 573,09 
31/08/2014 222.841.095.649.388.000,00 3,63E-09 0,09935139 1,90095 25 459,5745 0,00014914 1.931.323,58 4.700,00 410,92 489,75 
30/09/2014 263.623.410.749.534.000,00 3,26E-09 0,09866355 1,96168 25 564,7059 0,00015579 2.035.727,82 3.825,00 532,22 381,08 
31/10/2014 336.304.905.509.895.000,00 2,88E-09 0,09795279 2,02443 25 459,5745 0,00014945 2.273.037,82 4.700,00 483,63 342,38 
30/11/2014 320.532.059.789.074.000,00 2,50E-09 0,09726495 2,08515 25 540 0,00013976 1.871.660,48 4.000,00 467,92 378,9 
31/12/2014 307.081.470.445.705.000,00 2,12E-09 0,09655418 2,1479 25 568,4211 0,00015065 1.505.284,24 3.800,00 396,13 315,19 
31/01/2015 340.579.824.489.384.000,00 1,98E-09 0,09583201 2,20141 25 520,4819 0,00013769 1.550.292,53 4.150,00 373,56 228,53 
28/02/2015 329.538.396.656.713.000,00 1,86E-09 0,09517939 2,24947 25 608,4507 0,00014124 1.402.856,28 3.550,00 395,17 253,52 
31/03/2015 348.351.298.391.091.000,00 1,74E-09 0,09445684 2,30267 25 576 0,00014423 1.370.683,33 3.750,00 365,52 246,73 
30/04/2015 317.142.355.890.591.000,00 1,61E-09 0,0937576 2,35416 25 644,7761 0,00014367 1.150.317,17 3.350,00 343,38 232,83 
31/05/2015 359.082.535.929.914.000,00 1,48E-09 0,09303505 2,40736 25 583,7838 0,00013135 1.189.855,46 3.700,00 321,58 233,76 
30/06/2015 356.089.184.959.351.000,00 1,36E-09 0,09233581 2,45885 25 595,8621 0,0001506 1.073.396,69 3.625,00 296,11 263,29 
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31/07/2015 392.414.063.077.807.000,00 1,29E-09 0,09162466 2,46025 25 572,1854 0,0002743 1.116.751,62 3.775,00 295,83 286,98 
31/08/2015 423.446.540.478.744.000,00 1,23E-09 0,09091389 2,45992 25 550,3185 0,00020163 1.136.555,49 3.925,00 289,57 229,97 
30/09/2015 436.537.293.643.837.000,00 1,17E-09 0,09022605 2,4596 25 583,7838 0,00019448 1.104.250,41 3.700,00 298,45 238,73 
31/10/2015 454.915.351.205.089.000,00 1,10E-09 0,08951529 2,45927 25 587,7551 0,00019032 1.079.093,30 3.675,00 293,63 323,74 
30/11/2015 585.641.183.501.102.000,00 1,04E-09 0,08882745 2,45894 25 533,3333 0,00017171 1.301.143,68 4.050,00 321,27 376,91 
31/12/2015 733.276.604.663.887.000,00 9,78E-10 0,08811668 2,45861 25 608,4507 0,00017467 1.516.817,82 3.550,00 427,27 427,23 
31/01/2016 1.080.007.040.825.580.000,00 9,39E-10 0,08739835 2,53563 25 477,3481 0,00019987 2.128.181,98 4.525,00 470,32 380,6 
29/02/2016 1.080.919.494.946.580.000,00 9,04E-10 0,08672613 2,6101 25 649,6241 0,00019107 2.033.940,78 3.325,00 611,71 437,64 
31/03/2016 1.020.134.644.775.590.000,00 8,66E-10 0,08600756 2,6897 25 696,7742 0,00022663 1.823.962,81 3.100,00 588,38 419,06 
30/04/2016 1.296.655.181.852.460.000,00 8,30E-10 0,08531216 2,76673 25 591,7808 0,0001909 2.202.387,48 3.650,00 603,39 454,91 
31/05/2016 1.258.297.790.411.960.000,00 7,92E-10 0,08459358 2,84633 25 680,315 0,0002724 2.022.549,30 3.175,00 637,02 536,74 
30/06/2016 1.561.795.948.283.090.000,00 7,55E-10 0,08389818 2,92336 25 576 0,0002738 2.374.565,31 3.750,00 633,22 656,19 
31/07/2016 1.634.366.548.269.600.000,00 7,08E-10 0,08318716 3,50106 12,5 561,039 0,0003332 2.311.261,70 1.925,00 1.200,66 637,11 
31/08/2016 1.470.493.987.208.500.000,00 6,61E-10 0,08247639 4,09537 12,5 644,7761 0,00026822 1.924.777,31 1.675,00 1.149,12 575,59 
30/09/2016 1.702.788.621.491.550.000,00 6,16E-10 0,08178855 4,6705 12,5 608,4507 0,00028044 2.058.030,90 1.775,00 1.159,45 607,31 
31/10/2016 1.853.292.419.260.720.000,00 5,69E-10 0,08107779 5,26481 12,5 587,7551 0,00029949 2.050.763,15 1.837,50 1.116,06 703,38 
30/11/2016 1.989.192.739.728.200.000,00 5,23E-10 0,08038995 5,83995 12,5 608,4507 0,00034906 2.007.692,39 1.775,00 1.131,09 743,19 
31/12/2016 2.337.271.653.891.100.000,00 4,76E-10 0,07967918 6,43425 12,5 583,7838 0,00034947 2.127.820,45 1.850,00 1.150,17 960,06 
31/01/2017 2.832.474.910.223.240.000,00 4,39E-10 0,07895701 6,65505 12,5 595,8621 0,00054581 2.356.652,68 1.812,50 1.300,22 944,21 
28/02/2017 3.352.427.031.868.180.000,00 4,06E-10 0,07830439 6,84322 12,5 564,7059 0,00069929 2.557.532,97 1.912,50 1.337,27 1.179,77 
31/03/2017 3.352.999.966.358.030.000,00 3,69E-10 0,07758184 7,05156 12,5 640 0,00072154 2.305.431,71 1.687,50 1.366,18 1.045,03 
30/04/2017 3.918.071.610.127.890.000,00 3,34E-10 0,0768826 7,25318 12,5 572,1854 0,00074205 2.413.124,23 1.887,50 1.278,48 1.331,06 
31/05/2017 4.858.244.024.949.570.000,00 2,97E-10 0,07616005 7,46152 12,5 526,8293 0,00169231 2.638.419,76 2.050,00 1.287,03 2.253,65 
30/06/2017 5.448.313.580.843.890.000,00 2,62E-10 0,07546081 7,66314 12,5 561,039 0,00148698 2.581.552,37 1.925,00 1.341,07 2.519,27 
31/07/2017 6.200.470.684.210.650.000,00 2,43E-10 0,07474966 7,80012 12,5 595,8621 0,00074501 2.699.406,28 1.812,50 1.489,33 2.787,33 
31/08/2017 7.196.655.779.676.010.000,00 2,24E-10 0,07403889 7,93473 12,5 530,0613 0,00141945 2.868.460,96 2.037,50 1.407,83 4.689,86 
30/09/2017 7.569.349.388.439.090.000,00 2,07E-10 0,07335105 8,06499 12,5 626,087 0,00044927 2.752.160,90 1.725,00 1.595,46 4.286,64 
31/10/2017 9.966.505.886.699.330.000,00 1,88E-10 0,07264029 8,19959 12,5 626,087 0,0008189 3.269.542,29 1.725,00 1.895,39 6.248,49 
30/11/2017 11.182.287.318.862.000.000,00 1,70E-10 0,07195245 8,32985 12,5 517,3653 0,0007284 3.290.459,48 2.087,50 1.576,27 9.947,53 
31/12/2017 15.177.350.249.534.300.000,00 1,52E-10 0,07124168 8,46445 12,5 530,0613 0,00226165 3.945.345,24 2.037,50 1.936,36 13.205,27 
31/01/2018 15.139.761.911.894.200.000,00 1,44E-10 0,07051951 9,02997 12,5 738,4615 0,00067861 3.677.978,07 1.462,50 2.514,86 10.044,73 
28/02/2018 23.172.168.746.403.100.000,00 1,36E-10 0,06986689 9,55373 12,5 557,4194 0,00023166 5.290.600,85 1.937,50 2.730,63 10.684,50 
31/03/2018 22.031.861.231.379.800.000,00 1,28E-10 0,06914434 10,13361 12,5 675 0,0001394 4.679.625,97 1.600,00 2.924,77 7.076,98 
30/04/2018 30.990.335.301.692.100.000,00 1,20E-10 0,0684451 10,69478 12,5 557,4194 0,0001927 6.113.500,47 1.937,50 3.155,35 9.275,36 
31/05/2018 36.396.936.182.652.700.000,00 1,12E-10 0,06772255 11,27466 12,5 508,2353 0,00011035 6.621.116,56 2.125,00 3.115,82 7.554,11 
30/06/2018 35.588.942.295.590.800.000,00 1,04E-10 0,06702331 11,83583 12,5 612,766 0,00013842 5.954.819,71 1.762,50 3.378,62 6.387,05 
31/07/2018 43.474.975.975.433.800.000,00 1,04E-10 0,06683696 11,87825 12,5 587,7551 0,00010602 7.227.128,45 1.837,50 3.933,13 7.981,32 
31/08/2018 51.833.889.753.678.900.000,00 1,04E-10 0,06666848 11,90276 12,5 557,4194 0,00010263 8.584.395,67 1.937,50 4.430,66 6.977,97 
30/09/2018 57.956.171.195.079.300.000,00 1,03E-10 0,06650544 11,92648 12,5 530,0613 8,70E-05 9.563.447,82 2.037,50 4.693,72 6.599,64 
31/10/2018 58.201.028.613.416.300.000,00 1,03E-10 0,06633696 11,95099 12,5 530,0613 6,61E-05 9.567.716,85 2.037,50 4.695,81 6.328,46 
30/11/2018 33.404.486.801.782.100.000,00 1,03E-10 0,06617391 11,9747 12,5 855,4455 0,00018117 5.471.359,20 1.262,50 4.333,75 4.045,47 
31/12/2018 39.345.457.366.303.000.000,00 1,03E-10 0,06600544 11,99921 12,5 557,4194 5,11E-05 6.420.086,82 1.937,50 3.313,59 3.806,18 
Source: Author’s elaboration 
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Figure A.1: Time series 
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Source: Author’s elaboration 
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Table A.9: Johansen tests for cointegration 
1) Unrestricted trend 
 
2) Restricted trend 
 
3) Unrestricted constant 
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4) Restricted constant  
 
5) No trend 
 
Source: Author’s elaboration 
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Table A.10: Stability and Autocorrelation test 
1) Stability test 
 
2) Autocorrelation test 
 
Source: Author’s elaboration 
 
Table A.11: Breusch-Pagan test 
1) Breusch-Pagan test dlnPrice 
 
2) Breusch-Pagan test dlnModelPrice 
 
Source: Author’s elaboration 
